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1. Introduction 
There has been a fundamental institutional modernization of Bulgarian agriculture after 
1990 when post-communist transition and European Union (EU) integration has taken place. 
Bulgaria has joint the EU (January 1, 2007) with farming sector governed by quite specific 
(different from other EU and transitional countries) structures: a huge part-time and 
subsistence farming, and over-integrated and cooperative modes, and big reliance on 
“personal relations” at a large scale, and domination of primitive and “gray” structures, and 
weak markets, and poorly working formal institutions, and inefficient public support 
programs, and massive corruption etc. (Bachev 2005a, 2006). Therefore, EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) would likely be implemented in a particular “Bulgarian way” and 
achieve dissimilar results from other EU countries.  
In Bulgaria, and other new-member and candidate countries there are no comprehensive 
studies on agrarian governance structures. Besides, there are few projects on specific impact 
of institutional modernization and EU integration on farm structures and sustainability (EU 
2005a). Analyses are usually restricted to individual modes and particular type of farms 
(cooperatives, commercial, subsistence) or contracts (land supply, financing, marketing). 
Besides, uni-disciplinary approach dominates in economic studies as accent is exclusively put 
on farms “productivity” and “profitability”. Furthermore, a traditional (Neoclassical) 
framework is mostly applied assuming “institutional neutrality” and ignoring significant 
transaction costs. What is more, studies are focused merely on formal private and public 
forms disregarding widespread informal modes and mechanisms. Moreover, “normative” (to 
some ideal)1 rather than comparative institutional approach (between feasible alternatives) is 
broadly used. Likewise, uni-sectoral analyses are employed, and the governance of farming is 
separated from the rest of household’s activities. And finally, there are little studies on 
specific institutional, economic, cultural, etc. factors responsible for the big variation among 
countries and regions2.  
This paper incorporates achievements of a new inter-disciplinary methodology of the 
New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (integrating Economics, Organization, 
Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) into analysis of Bulgarian agriculture, 
and assess impact of institutional modernization and EU integration on farm structures and 
sustainability.  
Firstly, the new institutional and transacting costs economics framework is briefly 
presented concentrating on: evolution of formal and informal institutions; structure of 
transacting costs and their institutional, behavioral, dimensional and technological factors; 
comparative efficiency of alternative market, contract, internal, and  hybrid modes of 
governance; farm as a governance structure with a production and transaction optimization 
function.   
                                                 
1 E.g. institutional structure and model of farming in old EU countries. 
2 That has been also recognized by the specially organized EU workshops on CAP reforms and 
implementation (EU 2004, 2005a). 
 2
Secondly, an analysis is made on development of institutional environment for agrarian 
sector in Bulgaria, and its impact on newly evolving farming structure and on public readiness 
to implement EU CAP. 
Third, pace of evolution, and “high” efficiency and sustainability of dominating agro-
firms, production cooperatives, subsistence farming, and small commercial farms are 
explained, and prospects of their development in conditions of EU integration and CAP 
implementation determined. 
Forth, specific modes for governing of land supply, and labor supply, and service 
supply, and inputs supply, and finance supply, and insurance supply, and marketing in 
different type and kind commercial farms are identified, and their comparative efficiency 
assessed. 
Fifth, feasible pace of CAP implementation and further EU integration is projected, and 
likely impact on economic, environmental, social and organizational sustainability of farms 
estimated. 
This research would have a significant academic and practical (policy and business 
forwarded) importance. It will help better understand the specific “Bulgarian model” of 
transition and European integration; and give new insights on the role and efficiency of 
specific market, private, public, hybrid etc. modes of governance; and comprehend the “real” 
efficiency and sustainability of different farms and contractual arrangements; and present 
more realistic picture of prospects of EU integration, CAP implementation, and farming 
development. It would also assist improvement of public policies and programs at local, 
national, and EU levels, and market strategy, organizational and contract design of agrarian 
agents. Last but not least important, lessons from the “good” and “bad” Bulgarian experiences 
in institutional transformation could be effectively used by other candidate and transitional 
countries.  
 
2. Methodology 
     
In this paper we incorporate a framework of the new developing New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (Coase 1937, 1960; Furuboth and Richter, 1998; North 1990; 
Williamson 1996) into analysis of Bulgarian agriculture. Following this “new” logic we study 
institutions and transactions costs as crucial factors affecting agent’s behavior, and eventually 
determining the “specific” governing structures (typical farming organizations, contractual 
modes, informal and gray structures etc.).  
Firstly, we examine how the post-communist transformation and EU integration change 
the institutional environment (“rules of the game”) in Bulgarian agriculture - that is the 
specific structure of property rights and the system for enforcement of these rights3. That 
analysis includes the entire spectrum of rights and restrictions: on natural resources, material 
assets, activities, public support, food safety, clean environment, inter-generational justice etc. 
Besides, it embraces evolution of both formal institutions (defined by the EU and national 
laws, regulations, standards, court decisions etc.) and informal rules (determined by the 
tradition, customs, culture, religion, ideology, ethical norms etc.). Furthermore, the extend 
(efficiency) of enforcement of diverse rights by the state, court system, and other mechanisms 
(EU pressure, community actions, trust, reputation, private modes, self-enforcement) is 
specified. 
                                                 
3 Unlike lawyers who distinguish between property and human rights, for us (the economists) “all 
rights are propertory rights” (Furuboth and Richter, 1998). 
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Secondly, individual agrarian transaction and costs associated with transactions are 
turned into a basic unit of analysis. Various market forms of exchange (e.g. spotlight and 
classical contract), and special contractual arrangements (private ordering, alliances), and one 
person and collective (cooperation, partnerships, corporation) organizations, and hybrid 
modes (public intervention, public-private partnerships), all they are considered as alternative 
modes for governing of transactions. Accordingly, selection (or invention) of a particular 
arrangement for governing of resources, carrying activities, and/or management of 
transactions, is regarded as a (transaction) costs minimizing undertaking.  
Third, we determine how the new evolving institutional environment affects the level 
and structure of transaction costs in Bulgarian agriculture – that is the costs associated with 
protection and exchange of individuals’ rights4. That analysis includes all factors of 
transaction costs: 
- institutional – efforts and costs for studying and complying with various 
institutional restrictions and/or benefiting from new institutional opportunities; for formal 
registrations; for dealing with authorities (bureaucracy, courts etc.);  
- behavioral - agents’ bounded rationality5, tendency for opportunism6, risk aversion, 
trust, experience, preferences etc.;  
- dimensional - frequency of transactions between same partners, uncertainty 
surrounding transactions, assets specificity (dependency) associated with transaction, and 
appropriability of rights7;  
- technological – development of production, storage, transportation, communication, 
enforcement etc. technologies.  
Forth, comparative efficiency (advantages, disadvantages) of different market and 
private forms in the specific Bulgarian conditions are assessed in terms of capacity to: 
increase transacting benefits; comply with new market and institutional restrictions; take 
advantage of new market and institutional opportunities; decrease bounded rationality of 
agents; reduce uncertainty and risk; improve coordination and incentives; control transactions 
and protect dependant investments and (absolute and contracted) rights from possible 
opportunism; resolve disputes; and save current and long-term transacting costs. Likewise, 
diverse modes for a third party public (Government, EU, international assistance etc.) 
involvement (through assistance, arbitration, regulation, funding etc.) are judged in terms of 
their contribution to individual (market and private) transacting - facilitation and 
minimization of transaction costs, prevention and reduction of unwanted “exchanges”, 
overcoming serious transacting difficulties etc. 
                                                 
4 In addition to the production costs the economic agents make significant transaction costs for: 
discovery of the best prices and markets; and finding reliable partners for land, inputs, labor, finance 
supply and marketing; and negotiating the conditions of exchange; and completing (often writing 
down) the contract; and enforcing negotiated terms; and disputing through a court or another way; and 
adjusting or termination along with changing conditions of trade etc.  
5 Economic agents do not possess full information about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, 
counterpart’s possible behavior, trends in development) and they have to spend to increase their 
“imperfect rationality" (Williamson 1996). 
6 Individuals are given to opportunism in two forms: pre-contractual ("adverse selection") and post-
contractual ("moral hazard"). Thus if there is an opportunity for some of transacting sides to get non-
punishably an extra rent from exchange he (she) will likely do so. Therefore, significant ex-ante and 
ex-post investments have to be made to protect transactions from hazard of opportunism (Williamson 
1996). 
7 “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” have been identified as “critical dimensions” of 
transactions by Williamson (1996), and “appropriability” added by Bachev and Labonne (2000).  
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Fifth, the farm and farming organizations are studied not only as a production structure 
but as a major governing structure8. Efficiency of various Bulgarian farms (one person, 
family, unregistered, cooperative, registered, subsistence, non-for profit, profit making, 
hybrid), and their horizontal and vertical boundaries is evaluated in terms of their potential to 
maximize the overall benefits (and minimize the total costs) – both production9 and 
transaction10. Furthermore, level of sustainability of different farms is assessed though their 
potential (incentives, ability) for adaptation11 to evolving market, institutional, natural etc. 
environment.  
Six, specific modes for governing of major type agrarian transactions (land supply; labor 
supply; service supply; inputs supply; finance supply; insurance supply, and marketing) in 
Bulgarian commercial farms are identified, and their comparative efficiency assessed through 
a transaction costs (and discrete structural) analysis12. 
Finally, comparative institutional analysis is applied to project: the feasible pace, modes 
and extend of EU CAP implementation in “Bulgarian conditions”, and likely prospects for 
further institutional modernization, and probable level of farms adaptation to new institutional 
and market environment, and possible impact on economic, environmental, social and 
organizational sustainability of farms.   
The study is based on various official report, census, and statistical etc. data. Besides, 
original data for modes of organization of different type transactions have been collected from 
the managers of 2.8% of the cooperatives, 1.2% of the agro-firms, and 0.3% of the 
unregistered commercial farms. All farms were selected by the local agrarian and extension 
offices as representatives for the main regions of the country. Furthermore, interviews with 
the leading Bulgarian experts on farm structures (14 scholars from all major universities) have 
been organized to get assessment on likely impact of CAP implementation on sustainability of 
different farms. 
 
3. Transformation of Farm Structures 
 
3.1. Institutional framework 
 
The post-communist transformation of Bulgarian agriculture started in 1990 when 
reforms toward a market economy and EU integration were launched. Transition and 
modernization of farming sector was much slower and more painful than in other Central and 
East-European countries. The particular mode and pace of introduction of market institutions 
and Community acquis have brought about a quite specific farming structure during transition 
and accession to EU. Bulgarian model for institutional modernization is characterized by: 
● a specific mode for privatization of agricultural land. Following 1991 Land Law the 
entire (forcefully) “cooperated” or otherwise nationalized farmland was restituted to previous 
                                                 
8 Detailed elaboration of that approach is done by Bachev (2004). 
9 Exploration of technological economies of size and scale on specialized and specific capital; 
maximization of output, income and/or non-material benefits (e.g. satisfaction) etc. 
10 Economizing on transaction costs, maximizing transaction benefits etc. 
11 Our suggestion to use adaptability as a criteria and indicator for sustainability has been incorporated 
in one of the most advanced European System for Assessing Sustainability of Agriculture Systems – 
SAFE (Sauvenier et al. 2005). 
12 Very often a direct assessment of related transaction costs is very difficult or impossible to make. 
Therefore, we “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with governance structures (differing in 
their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” 
(Williamson 1996). 
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owners in real boundaries and original (historical or comparable) locations13. Unprecedented 
and a complex land transformation was implemented which took almost 10 years to complete 
affecting more than 85% of the agricultural land and turning a three-quarters of Bulgarian 
household into landlords14. The privatization of farmland led to rising of a great number of 
private farms established on provisional or completely restituted land rights15.  
A prolonged institutional vacuum associated with the lack of full private ownership had 
important consequences for the development of land markets, and the type of farming 
organization, and the efficiency of land use (Bachev 2000). Sells and long-term lease markets 
for agricultural land did not emerge until 2000. Leasing on an annual base was a major way 
for extension of farm size until recently. Agrarian agents were neither able to get full return 
on their proprietary rights (in sell or lease markets) nor to use the land ownership for 
organization of other effective transactions (such as joint ventures, collateral against bank 
credit etc.). A huge part-time and subsistence farming, and production cooperation at a large 
scale, and little sustainability of bigger agro-firms and cooperatives (based on provisional 
lease-in contracts), all they come as a result. Reducing and fragmentation of land ownership 
have been connected with wide-spreading of miniature (subsistence or semi-subsistent) 
farming, and primitive technologies (backward “technological development”), and a low 
competitiveness of the majority of newly established farms. Besides, a significant part of the 
agrarian assets (e.g. irrigation facilities, wine yards, orchards etc.) have been abundant or 
destroyed, and one-third of productive farmland has been left unused for most of the time. On 
the other hand, unspecified and/or “ideal” character of the ownership let rapid concentration 
of farmland management in a small number of huge farms (cooperatives and agro-firms). 
However, practicing of a short lease on fragmented land in the large business enterprises has 
been associated with high transacting costs, reluctance of longer-term investment in land, 
strong preference to one-season crops, and rising environmental problems16.  
● a specific form for reorganization of former farming structure. Following the Land 
Law all old cooperatives and other organizations established on their bases were liquidated 
and their assets distributed into individual shares17. The liquidation of the ancient structures 
took more than 4 years, and it was associated with large direct costs, enormous 
mismanagement and distortion of agrarian assets, and unfair allocation of the individual 
shares (Bachev 2000). The privatization of the agrarian assets contributed to a rapid 
development of private farming and (to a great extend) predetermined the type of farm 
organization. More than 2 millions Bulgarians got small stakes in the assets of ancient 
cooperatives. In many cases the individual shares constituted the initial capital for 
establishment of new individual or family farms. The nature of acquired shares (mostly 
                                                 
13 State land comprised around 10% of agricultural land, and it has been used for compensation of 
private owners, lendsetlment of landless, experimental farming, or leasing out to private entrepreneurs. 
Currently state land accounts for 4.7% of the farmland in the country. 
14 More than 1.7 million claims for restoration were made with an average size of land per claimant of 
2.7 ha for property usually situated in a number of different locations (MAF). Eighty six percent of the 
claims were made by the heirs (of the original owners) who had to get equal shares in the restituted 
farmland. Thus acquired “new” private rights on lands were in dozen of millions plots in many 
instances smaller than 0.1 ha.  
15 After 1991 more than 1.7 million private farms emerged in the country (National Statistical 
Institute). 
16 Insufficient fertiliser compensation of extracted nitrogen, phosphates and potassium; and non-
observing the crop-rotation requirements; and non-complying with anti-erosion and biodiversity 
norms; and excessive soil and water pollution in some regions etc. 
17 Most divisible assets (livestock, fruit trees, vineyards) were physically distributed among the 
eligible shareholders. A great part of machinery and buildings were soled out on internal auctions. The 
remaining portion of individual shares was transferred to the new emerging cooperatives. 
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livestock) and their petite size18 affected significantly the scale and (subsistence, part-time) 
character of a considerable amount of farms. Furthermore, most agents found their individual 
shares in agrarian assets in a high interdependency. Besides its small size, a great part of 
individuals stakes were in indivisible assets such as large machinery, buildings, processing 
and irrigation facilities etc. For new owners there were no any alternative but liquidate 
(through sales, consumption) or keep them up as a joint (cooperative) ownership. In many 
cases, the landlords got restituted their plots with fruit trees, vineyards etc., and they could 
practically execute much of the activities (mechanization, plant protection, irrigation etc.) in a 
cooperation. Which is more, most land and share-holders happened to live away from rural 
areas, or have other business, or be old of age, or have no skills or capital to start own farms. 
In the absence of a big demand for farmland and confidence in the emerging new private 
modes, the only option was to joint the cooperative. In that way more than 40% of the new 
owners have pulled their land and assets in the new production cooperatives.  
Privatization of the state agrarian property has been very slow and it is still incomplete 
for some important assets (e.g. enormous hydro-melioration infrastructure, huge 
“experimental” farms of research institutes etc.). It has been connected with inefficient 
organization, immense mismanagement and corruption, and formation of quasi-public 
(private) monopoly companies concentrating critical agrarian assets and services. All these 
further impede restructuring of the farming system in the country. 
● lack of efficient public support to new evolving farm structures. Transitional Bulgarian 
farming has been one of the least supported in Europe. Until 2000 the public aid was mainly 
in the form of preferential short-term credit for the grain producers and insignificant support 
to capital investments19. There has been considerable progress in the public support to 
agrarian sector since 2000 - EU Special Assistance Program for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (SAPARD), State Fund Agriculture (SFA) etc. However, the overall support to 
farms rests very little and much below the level in the EU and other countries in the region.20. 
Besides, only a small proportion of the farms benefits from some form of public assistance 
most of them being large enterprises from the most developed regions21.  
What is more, the public institutions and infrastructure crucial for the effective farming 
development have not been built in the country22: public system for enforcement of laws, 
regulations, and contracts does not work well; essential property rights (on environmental 
resources and biodiversity, special and organic products, intellectual agrarian property) are 
not well defined and/or properly enforced; public support programs are rarely governed 
effectively and in the best interest of the legitimate beneficiaries; the newly established 
agricultural advisory system does not serve the majority of farms; urgently needed public 
                                                 
18 Averaging Bulgarian Leva’s equivalent of few hundred euro rapidly inflating by the sky-high 
depreciation of the local currency during that period.  
19 There were also sporadic inefficient measures to support producers through price guarantee and 
export regimes. Estimates demonstrate that the Aggregate Level of Support to Agriculture before 2000 
was very low, close to zero or even negative (OECD 2000). 
20 For 2001-2005 the share of SAPARD investments and subsidies in Gross Value Added were 3.6% 
and 1.8% accordingly; SFA’s portions of the investment credit in the Gross Value Added was 0.4%, 
and of the short-term (credits and subsidies) support in the Gross Value of Agricultural Production 
0.8%. Only tobacco producers enjoyed a high level of support having a good part of the output (40-
46%) subsidised (Bachev 2005a). 
21 Under the SAPARD Measure "Investment in agricultural holdings” only 7.7% of all agro-firms, 
2.3% of cooperatives, and insignificant number of unregistered farms got funding from the program as 
few projects are from the less-developed regions like South-West, North-West, and mountainous parts 
of the country (Interim Assessment of SAPARD Program in Bulgaria, MAF, 2004). 
22 There have been a great number of bad government (under and over) interventions in agrarian 
sphere during the transition (Bachev and Tsuji 2001). 
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system for agrarian insurance has not been introduced; crucial agrarian and rural 
infrastructure (wholesale markets, irrigation, roads, communication technologies) has not 
been modernized; public support for initiating and developing farming associations has not 
been given; multifunctional role of agriculture has not been recognized and financially 
supported etc. (Bachev 2005a).  
Subsequently, the modernization of Bulgarian farms according to the EU (quality, 
safety, environmental, animal welfare) standards has been delayed; and growth in the farms 
productivity and competitiveness severely restricted; and technological and income disparity 
between farms of different type, sub-sectors and regions broadened. All that will have serious 
negative implications for the competitiveness and sustainability of considerable number of 
farms after joining the EU (Bachev 2005b). Moreover, a spectrum of specific modes (such as 
interlinked organization, vertical integration, personal and informal modes) to mitigate 
“market”, “contract”, and “government” failures have been broadly used by agents (Bachev 
and Tsuji 2001), and characterize farming structure in the wake of EU accession.   
● insufficient readiness for implementation of the EU CAP. For a short period of time 
country’s laws and standards have been harmonized with the immense EU legislation23. A 
good part of this new framework is neither well-known nor clearly understood by the 
implementing public authorities, and affected private organizations and individuals. In many 
instances, there have been discrepancies or mistakes in adapting EU regulations to local 
conditions. Generally, there is not enough readiness for effective implementation of the new 
policies and standards because of the lack of experience in agents, and adequate 
administrative capacity, and/or practical possibility for enforcement of novel norms 
(incomprehension, not-working court system, widespread corruption). In addition to the 
requirements to fight against corruption and reforming administration and juridical system, 
the Monitoring Report for the Preparation for EU Membership has also underlined the 
specific problems associated with CAP implementation in Bulgaria: operability of the 
Integrated Administration and Control System for CAP, not existence of Land Parcel 
Identification System, insufficient financial control capacity for Structural Funds 
implementation, needs for effective measures for collecting dead animals and animal by-
products, and control on food safety (EU 2006). Therefore, there will be some time lag until 
“full” implementation of the CAP depending on the pace of building an effective public and 
private capacity as well as training of (acquiring learning by doing experience by) 
bureaucracy, farmers, and other agrarian agents. Besides, there will be significant inequalities 
in application (enforcement) of new standards in diverse sectors of agriculture, and farms of 
different type and size, and various regions of the country.  
Thus specific (“transitional”) farming structure will sustain during first years after EU 
accession and beyond. It will include diverse private modes for securing quality and safeguard 
transactions (investments) as well as a large informal (gray or illegal) sector non-conforming 
with EU standards and norms. Furthermore, having in mind the huge amount of forthcoming 
funds, there will be expansion of legitimate and illegal modes for taking stakes in the new EU 
funding by individuals and groups. Thus we should expect new “organizational development” 
comprising various specialized entities, coalitions, unlawful claims for receiving public 
subsidies, interlinks involving agrarian bureaucracy, under the table payments, other forms for 
misuse of public funds and transfers to affiliated individuals and organizations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Acquis communitaire contains 26000 pieces of legislation accounting for 80000 pages (EU 2005b). 
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 3.2. Development of large business organizations 
 
During the first years of transition there was a “boom” in creation of private farms on 
the base of restituted farmland and agrarian assets. Most new farms were highly unsustainable 
and there has been a considerable size adjustment since then (Table 1). Land management has 
been transferred into few thousands big enterprises while other farms concentrated on labor-
intensive activities or got subsistence character.  
Large specialized enterprises are one of the immanent features of Bulgarian farming. 
Most of them are registered as Sole traders, Companies, or Partnerships (Table 2). The 
number of agro-firms has increased 20 folds since 1990 and their share in overall resources 
augmented. They account for a tinny portion of all farms but concentrate a significant part of 
the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA), material assets, and certain productions (cereals, 
industrial crops, orchards, poultry and swine).  
Table 1:  Evolution of farms with Utilized agricultural area in Bulgaria  
Farm size (ha) Share in farms (%) Share in land (%) Average size (ha) 
 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 
0.01-0.1* 44.9 12.72 6.4 0.17 0.15 0.06 
0.1 -0.49 18.8 38.02 10.5 2.46 0.6 0.29 
0.5-0.99 17.4 25.89 14.8 4.00 0.91 0.68 
1-1.99 12.6 13.74 18 4.14 1.54 1.34 
2-4.99 4.9 6.39 19.8 4.19 4.35 2.91 
5-9.99 0.8 1.48 7.8 2.21 10 6.61 
10-49.99 0.18 0.98 4.9 4.37 29.27 19.74 
50-99.99 0.01 0.19 1.4 2.86 114.74 68.28 
more than 100 0.02 0.59 16.6 75.60 1086.13 566.07 
Total 1917000 654808 2061200 2904480 1.07 4.44 
* up to 0.2 in 1994 
Source:  National Statistical Institute 1994, Agricultural Holdings Census 2003 
 
A good number of large farms were set up as family and partnership businesses in the 
beginning of transition by young generation entrepreneurs - former managers (specialists) of 
public farms, individuals with high business spirit and know-how etc. In addition, some state 
companies were taken over by the former managers and registered as shareholdings. Joint 
ventures with non-agrarian and foreign capital started to appear as well. The specific 
management skills and “social” status, and combination and complementarities of partner’s 
assets (technological knowledge, business and other ties, available resources) let rapid 
extension of farms through enormous concentration of (management, ownership) of land and 
other resources, and exploration of economy of scale and size, and modernization of 
enterprises (Bachev 2000). The specific mode (and pace) of privatization of farmland and 
other agrarian assets24 facilitated a fast consolidation of fragmented land ownership and 
agrarian assets in the large farms. In transitional market and institutional uncertainty and 
unsettled property rights of major resources, the personal relations and “quasi”/entirely 
integrated modes were extensively used to overcome transacting difficulties. Private (rather 
than faceless market) governance of critical transactions, coo-financing, common (joint) 
ownership, integration of farming into inputs supply, processing, and marketing, all they are 
                                                 
24 E.g. “ideal” titles on farmland during restitution process, indivisible individual shares in material 
assets of ancient cooperatives, “managerial” privatization of state farms etc. 
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typical for these enterprises (Bachev 2006). Furthermore, the large operational size gives 
enormous possibilities to explore technological opportunities (consolidation of land, economy 
of scale and scope on machineries, cheap and standardized produce etc.) and achieve a high 
productivity. 
The large business farms are strongly profit-oriented organizations. Farmer(s) have 
great incentives to invest in farm specific (human, material, intangible) capital because they 
are sole owners of residual rights (benefits) of the farm. Owners are family members or close 
partners, and internal transaction costs for coordination, decision making, and motivation are 
not high. Increased number of coalition (partnership) gives additional opportunity for internal 
division of labor and profiting from specialization - full-time engagement in production 
management, technological development, marketing, paper works, “public” relations, keeping 
up with changes in laws and standards etc. 
Table 2:  Share of different farms in total number of holdings, major resources, 
and productions in Bulgaria 
Indicators Physical 
persons 
Coope-
ratives
Sole 
traders 
Com-
panies 
Partner-
ships 
Number of holdings with UAA (%) 99.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.05 
Utilized agricultural area (%) 30.3 40.3 11.7 16.1 1.6 
Average size (ha) 1.4 592.6 118.8 352.5 126.2 
Number of breeders without UAA (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.1 
Workforce (%) 95.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.3 
Labor input (%) 91.1 4.1 1.4 2.8 0.6 
Cereals (%) 26.6 41.8 13.0 17.3 1.3 
Industrial crops (%) 20.5 45.1 14.2 18.6 1.6 
Fresh vegetables (%) 86.4 4.4 4.2 4.6 0.4 
Orchards and vineyards (%) 52.3 29.5 2.9 10.7 4.6 
Cattle (%) 90.2 5.1 1.5 2.5 0.7 
Sheep (%) 96.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Pigs (%) 60.3 1.4 7.0 30.5 0.8 
Poultry (%) 56.5 0.2 13.3 29.3 0.7 
Source:  MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census 2003 
Greater size and reputation of the farms make them a preferable partner for land, labor 
and inputs suppliers, and downstream industries. Moreover, big farms can secure best deals 
since they offer better trade conditions (price, wages, rents, and terms of contracts) then 
competing small-scale and cooperative farms. Recurrence of transactions with “the same 
partners” is high which restrict information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, and let 
develop mutual trust and other mechanisms for facilitating relationships – planning, 
adjustment and payment modes, guarantee schemes, dispute resolution devices etc. Besides, 
large business farms have a giant negotiating power and effective economic, political etc. 
mechanisms to enforce contracts. They also possess a great potential to collect market and 
regulatory information, search best partners, promote products, adjust to new market demand 
and institutional requirements, use outside experts, prepare business projects, meet special 
(collateral, hostage) requirements, bear risk and costs of failures. In addition, they could 
explore economy of scale and scope on production and management (e.g. “package” 
arrangement of credits for many projects; interlinking inputs supply with know-how supply, 
crediting, and marketing). Large farms have strong incentives and potential for innovation – 
available resources to purchase and adapt new technologies and varieties; possibility to hire 
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leading experts and arrange direct supply from consulting companies and research institutes. 
What is more, they are able to invest considerable relation-specific capital (information, 
expertise, reputation, lobbying, bribing) for dealing with funding institutions, agrarian 
bureaucracy, and market agents at national or even at international scale. Further, they have 
enormous political power to lobby for Government support in their best interests.  
The firm mode is generally preferred since it gives extra opportunities to overcome 
coalition difficulties (e.g. formation joint ventures with outside capital, dispute ownerships 
right through a court system); and diversify into farm related and independent businesses 
(trade, agro-tourism, processing etc.); and develop firm-specific intangible capital 
(advertisement, reputation, brand names, public confidence) and its exploration (extension 
into daughter company), trade (sell, licensing), and intergeneration transfer (inheriting); and 
overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. for direct foreign investments in farmland, 
engaging in trade with cereals, vine and dairy); and have explicit rights for taking parts in 
particular types of transactions (export licensing, privatization deals, assistance programs) etc.    
In recent years there have appeared some new opportunities to benefit from preferential 
public programs for modernization of agriculture. Namely these farms have been quite 
successful in developing good proposals, meeting formal requirements, dealing with 
complicated paper work, and “arranging” selection of their projects for getting public 
subsidies25; purchasing up-to-date machinery; building modern orchards, vineyards, and 
processing facilities; improving environmental performance etc.  
The large business farms have significant comparative advantages in terms of 
adaptability to market and institutional changes, effective governance, and high productivity. 
They will rest highly sustainable in the future when they will have a greater access to EU 
markets, and further opportunities to benefit from huge public (EU, Government) support 
programs.    
 
3.3. Evolution of production cooperatives  
 
Production cooperation is another “phenomenon” of the transitional Bulgarian 
agriculture. More than 3000 new production cooperatives emerged during and after 
liquidation of the ancient “cooperative” structures in 1992-95 (Table 3). The cooperatives 
have been the biggest farms in terms of land management, and concentrated a major part of 
cereals, oil and forage crops, orchards and vineyards. Besides, they are a key service provider 
for their members and rural population. (Table 2). 
The cooperative was the single effective form for farming organization in the absence of 
settled rights on main agrarian resources and/or inherited high interdependence of available 
assets (restituted farmland, acquired individual shares in the actives of old cooperatives, 
narrow specialization of labor) (Bachev 2000). Moreover, most cooperatives developed along 
with the small-scale and subsistent farming. Namely, “non-for-profit” character and strong 
member (rather than market) orientation attracted the membership of many households. In the 
transitional conditions of undeveloped markets, high inflation, and high unemployment, the 
production coop was perceived as an effective (cheap, stable) form for supply of highly 
specific to individual farms inputs and services (production of feed for animals; 
mechanization of major operations; storage, processing, and marketing of farm output) and/or 
food for households consumption.  
The cooperative rather than other formal collective (e.g. firm) form has been mostly 
preferred. Coops were initiated by older generation entrepreneurs and a long-term cooperative 
                                                 
25 Under the SAPARD Measure "Investment in agricultural holdings” 64 % of all funded projects is  
for agro-firms (Interim Assessment of SAPARD Program in Bulgaria, MAF, 2004). 
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tradition from the communist period had a role to play. Besides, this mode allows individuals 
an easy and low costs entree and exit from the coalition, and keeping a full control on a major 
resource (such as farmland), and “democratic” participation in and control on management 
(“one member-one vote” principle). In addition, cooperative form gives some important tax 
advantages such as tax exemption on sale transactions with individual members and on 
received rent in kind. Also there are legal possibilities for organization of transactions not 
legitimate for other modes such as credit supply, marketing, and lobbying at nation-wide 
scale26.  
 
Table 3:  Number and size of production cooperatives in Bulgarian agriculture  
Year Number Utilized farmland Members Average size 
  (100 ha) Share (%)  (ha) Members 
1992 347 670 1.2 n.a. 193.08 n.a. 
1993 1230 7560 13.2 268000 614.88 218 
1994 1873 13420 23.4 468000 716.6 250 
1995 2623 20980 36.6 678000 800.04 258 
1996 3213 21880 38.2 736000 681.05 229 
1997 3229 24343 42.5 751000 753.89 232 
1998 3269 24270 42.4 765000 742.53 234 
1999 3238 22967 40.1 772000 709.29 239 
2000 3125 22185 44.4 n.a. 709.9 n.a. 
2001 2900 17386 50.6 n.a. 599.5 n.a. 
2002 2010 13600 42.9 n.a. 676.6 n.a. 
2003 1992 11693 40.2 n.a. 592.6 n.a. 
Source: National Statistical Institute 
 
Relatively bigger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for efficient 
use of labor (teamwork, division and specialization of work), farmland (cultivation in big 
consolidated plots, effective crop rotation, environment protection), and material assets 
(exploration of economy of scale and scope on large machinery). In addition, they have 
superior potential to minimize market uncertainty (dependency) and increase marketing 
efficiency (“risk pooling”, advertisement, storing, integration into processing and marketing); 
and organize some critical transactions (better access to commercial credit; stronger 
negotiating positions in input supply and marketing; facilitate land consolidation through 
lease-in and lease-out deals; introduce technological innovations); and invest in intangible 
capital (good reputation, own labels, brand names) etc. In situation of “missing markets” in 
rural areas, the cooperative mode is also the single form for organization of certain 
transactions - undertaking bakery, retail trade, recreation etc.  
The cooperative activity is not difficult to manage since internal (members) demand for 
output and services is known and “marketing” secured beforehand. In addition, coops 
concentrate on few highly standardized (mass) products (such as wheat, sunflower etc.) with a 
stable market and high profitability. All that assists financing as advance funding of 
commissioned by members activities is practices, while production of universal commodities 
is easier financed by public programs or commercial credit.  
Furthermore, the coop applies low costs long-term lease for land supply from its 
members. Often that is coupled with simultaneous lease-out deals as a specific mode for 
cashing coops output or facilitating relations between landlords and private farms. Output-
                                                 
26 Forbidden for business firms by the Double-taxation and Antimonopoly Laws. 
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based payment of labor is common which restrict opportunism and minimize internal 
transaction costs. Besides, cooperatives provide employment for members who otherwise 
would have no other job opportunities - housewives, pre- and retired persons. They are 
preferable employer since they offer higher job security, social and pension payments, paid 
day-offs and annual holidays, opportunity for professional (including career) development. 
Giving the considerable transacting benefits most of the coop members accept lower (than 
market) return on their resources - lower wages, inferior or no rent for land and dividends for 
shares.  
There have been some adjustments in coops size, memberships, and production 
structure. A number of them have moved toward corporative (“new generation”) type 
governance applying profit-making goals, close-membership policy, joint-ventures with other 
organizations etc.  
At the same time, cooperatives have shown certain disadvantages as a form for farm 
organization. A big membership of the coalition makes individual and collective control on 
management very difficult (costly). That gives a great possibility for mismanagement and/or 
let using coops in the best interests of managers or private groups around them (on-job 
consumption, unprofitable for members’ deals, corruption). Generally the new cooperative 
organization did not overcome the incentive problems associated with the team working in the 
old style cooperatives27. Furthermore, there are differences in investment preferences of 
diverse members (old-younger; working-non-working; large-small shareholders) due to non-
tradable character of cooperative shares (“horizon problem”). While working and younger 
members are interested in long-term investments and growth of salaries, income in kind, other 
on-job benefits, the older and no working members favor higher current gains (income, land 
rent and dividend). Given the fact that most members are small shareholders, and older in age, 
and non-permanent employees, the incentives for long-term investment for land improvement 
(P and K fertilizing, irrigation equipment) and for renovation of outdated machinery, 
orchards, vineyards, have been very low. Finally, many coops fall short in adapting to 
diversified (service) needs of members, and exacting market demand, and growing 
competition. For all these reasons, the economic performance and productivity of production 
cooperatives have not been good28. Accordingly, efficiency of cooperatives has diminished 
considerably in relation to other modes of organization (market, contracts, partnerships, 
alliances etc.). Since property rights on farmland were definitely restored in 2000 many 
landlords have pooled out their land from the cooperatives. Consequently, almost 40% of 
coops have bankrupted or ceased to exist in the last 5 years. 
However, most cooperatives will sustain in years to come since they will keep their 
advantages to a large number of petite landowners, rural labor, small and subsistent farms. 
Recent public interventions though subsidies and credits for farm and rural investments, and 
incoming EU direct payments, all they give an opportunity to overcome coops funding 
problem. Besides, some market protection, environmental, infrastructural, and rural 
development projects, which require large collective actions (farmers organizations), could be 
effectively initiated, coordinated, and carried by existing cooperatives or mix (coop-private, 
coop-public) modes (Bachev 2005a). Adaptability of cooperatives to new challenges would 
be significantly increased through public training of their staff in business and agro-
environmental management, carrying out an effective control on coops activities, and 
providing assistance in farm and cooperative associations.  
 
                                                 
27 Over employment, equalized remuneration, authoritarian management, adverse feeling towards 
private farming, system of personal plots etc. have been broadly practicing in many new coops. 
28 Some estimates show that the rate of profitability of cooperatives is 5 times lower than in private 
farms - namely 4.7% against 26.5% in non cooperative farms (Koteva and Kaneva, 2006). 
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3.4. Sustainability of subsistence farming  
 
A small-scale and subsistence farming has been another extreme of the transitional 
Bulgarian agriculture. According to different data subsistence farms comprise between 0.64-
1.5 million accounting for 94% of all farms and cultivating around 15% of the total 
agricultural land (National Statistical Institute). More than 97% of livestock holdings are also 
miniature “unprofessional farms” breading 96% of goats, 86% of sheep, 78% of cattle, and 
60% of pigs (MAF 2004). Consequently, a significant portion of the entire output of 
vegetables, fruits, vine, livestock has been for “own consumption”. Less than 39% of 
censused unregistered farms report they sell products, and in more than 50% of cases those 
are surpluses not consumed by households (MAF, 2003). Almost 1 million Bulgarians are 
involved in farming on a part-time base and use it as “supplementary” income source (MAF, 
2005). 
The post-communist agrarian reform turned most households into owners of farmland, 
livestock, equipment, etc. An internal organization of available family resources in an own 
farm was an effective way to overcome a great institutional, market, and economic 
uncertainty and insecurity, and minimize costs of transacting (Bachev 2000). Private rights on 
farmlands were not entirely restituted for a long period of time making market and contract 
trade with land very difficult or impossible at all. Besides, there was “oversupply” of 
farmland and the effective demand was not immense. Many Bulgarians lost their jobs as a 
result of privatization of the public farms and industrial companies. Starting up an own farm 
was the most effective (or only) mode for productive use of existing resources (“free” labor, 
land, technological know-how). Moreover, a large portion of the people was at pre-retired or 
retired age having no other job alternatives. For others farming was stable “temporary” or 
second employment in conditions of high insecurity in the job market.  
During much of the transition market and contract trade of household’s capital (land, 
labor) was either impossible or very expensive (“missing” markets, high uncertainty and risk, 
asymmetry of information, big possibility for opportunism in time of hardship). In addition, 
low payoff of outside trade (high inflation; non-payment or delayed payments of pensions, 
wages, and rents) was combined with an increased share of households’ food costs. Therefore, 
internal organization turned to be the most effective way to protect and get return on 
resources, and secure a stable income. A long-term tradition with “personal plots” from the 
communist period, and insignificant costs for acquiring specialized knowledge (information, 
training, learning by doing experience) made initiation and development costs for own farm 
accessible for everybody. In addition, there was a great (price, quantity, quality) uncertainty 
associated with market supply of basic foods (many new suppliers, no reputation built, poor 
assortment, insufficient enforcement of quality standards etc.). For lots of consumers an 
internal organization (own production) has been an effective mode to guarantee cheep, stable, 
safe, and high quality delivery of food. Internal organization (own farm) is also a preferred 
and secure mode for providing full or part-time employment for family members (retired, 
housewives, children). Also for many farming happened to be a favorable full-time or free-
time occupation. 
Some of the major factors that brought to existence subsistent farming persist – high 
economic insecurity and unemployment, low income and purchasing power of households, 
uncertainty associated with market supply of food (freshness, safety, quality, prices) etc. At 
the same time, most subsistence farms have no intention to extend size and shift to 
commercial operation because of the other major occupations, and limits of household 
demands and resources, and advanced age of farmers etc. Besides, transaction costs to enlarge 
farms through outside supply of additional land, labor, and finance, and marketing would be 
extremely high (no entrepreneurial capital available). In addition, further extension of farms 
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will be restricted by the vast costs for studying out and respecting the new institutional 
restrictions (regulations; quality, veterinary, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards), 
and establishing “relations” with agrarian bureaucracy (registrations, certifications, paper 
works etc.). On the other hand, there will be practically impossible and/or politically 
undesirable for the Government to enforce the official standards in that huge informal sector 
of the economy. What is more, some subsistence farms will be eligible for CAP direct 
payments and see their “profitability” increased. Therefore, majority of subsistent farms will 
be highly sustainable in years to come.  
 
3.5. Development of small-scale commercial farming  
 
Majority of the commercial farms are “unregistered farms” with an average size of 1.8 
ha and less than a fifth share in total farmland. They are mainly in labor-intensive productions 
(vegetables, tobacco, vineyards, berries, melons, flowers, mushrooms, medicinal and aromatic 
crops, livestock, sericulture, bee kipping) and natural meadows. Those are predominately 
individual or family holdings, and farm size is exclusively determined by the available 
household resources – farmland, labor, finance etc. Internal governing costs are insignificant 
since transactions are between family members (common goals, high confidence, and no 
cheating behavior dominates) or not existing at all (one-person farm). A small collective 
organization of production is also practiced for some activities (e.g. group pasture of animals, 
common guarding of yields), which allows a partial exploration of economies of scale or 
make part-time farming practically possible. The former mode is cost-effective since 
transactions are not complicated and easily controlled. Besides, group members are usually 
close friends, neighbors, or relatives, and a mutual trust and self-restriction of opportunism 
govern relations.  
Commercial farmers have strong incentives to adapt to market demand and increase 
productivity (intensifying work, investing in human and material assets) since they own the 
whole residuals (income). The extension of farm size through outside supply of labor or 
services is restricted since directing, monitoring, and disputing costs are extremely high in 
labor-demanding and spatially dispersed productions. An external financing of farming via 
debt, equity sell, or preferential public programs have been out of reach because of the high 
costs for preparing project proposals; and meeting formal paperwork, ownership, coo-
financing etc. requirements; and “arranging” funding. Thus possibility for an effective farm 
enlargement and growth in productivity through mechanization, application of chemicals, 
innovation has been limited by the small internal investment capacity (savings, profit). In 
general, primitive technologies and poor environmental and animal welfare standards prevail 
in small farms.  
Own farm enterprise has been a secure mode for providing (full or part-time) 
employment for family members. Family organization is also an effective form for 
intergeneration transfer of farm-specific intangible assets (such as know-how, learning by 
doing experience, reputation). In some intensive areas (e.g. off-season vegetables and fruits) 
small-scale farming has been quite effective in product quality and price competition bringing 
a good income for households. What is more, some produces of small commercial farms 
enjoy increasing (national and international) demand because of the low level of 
intensification (reduced or no chemical use, extensive breeding of animals), and high quality 
and good taste of products.   
However, small-scale commercial farms have a little ability to meet institutional and 
market restrictions, to bear the risk, and protect against natural and market hazards. A great 
number of them face great transacting difficulties in marketing of their output. Most often 
they are not preferable partners for big buyers because of the small volume and less-
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standardized character of output, and impossibility (unaffordable costs) to verify quality of 
products through laboratory tests, certificates etc. On the other hand, official wholesale 
markets have been inaccessible for these farms for the reason of great distance; high fees; and 
requirements for volume, special preparation, certification etc. Besides, farms frequently 
experience no accomplishment of contract obligations (none or delayed payment), huge 
market price fluctuation, (quasi) monopoly situation, missing markets etc. In order to protect 
transacting and avoid unwanted exchanges the primitive forms for risk minimization is 
commonly used such as investment in more universal but less productive (profitable) assets, 
diversification of production, informal cash and carry deals, direct retail marketing etc.  
With an exception of tobacco producers29 development of an effective collective 
organization for risk sharing, price negotiation, marketing, and/or lobbying for public 
support, have been difficult. That has been because of the high transacting costs (“free riding” 
problem)30, and diversified interests of individual farmers (old-young farmers; larger or 
smaller-size farms; specialized-diversified operators etc.), and low reputation and 
mismanagement of the emerging farmers associations. Majority of small commercial farms 
are vulnerable and have poor mechanisms to protect from outside institutional, market, and 
natural disturbances. Most of them have little ability to face severe market competition, and 
meet institutional restrictions, and bear the risk, and safeguard against natural and market 
hazard (buy insurance, diversify, or cooperate). All these bring about for a significant income 
variation for individual farms, (sub) sectors, regions, and different years. Consequently, there 
has been a constant process of transfer of land management toward bigger farms, and a 
decrease in the number of small commercial farms (Table 1). 
Different fractions of small commercial farms are with unequal sustainability. Unlike 
other forms of organization the life cycle of the one-person (family) farm is greatly 
determined by the age of the entrepreneur. Besides, incentives for a long-term investment in 
specialized assets for increasing sustainability are low for older farmers since there is no 
secondary market for farm-specific assets (e.g. investments in human capital, good reputation, 
know-how, organizational modernization). Therefore, a good number of small commercial 
farms will operate at low sustainable level (at present or smaller scale) given the fact that 
most of the farm managers and labor are old in age31.  
In addition, most professional livestock farms are highly unsustainable because of their 
low productivity and non-conformity with the EU hygiene, quality, animal welfare, and 
environmental standards. Some of them (mostly cattle, sheep and goat farms) will increase 
their present size with additional specialized investments in modern technologies and 
environmental protection. That would enhance their ability to compete, and meet strict 
institutional requirements, and participate in various public support programs.  These farms 
will continue to rely on family labor for carrying out all critical and highly specific 
transactions (care for animals, supply of forage etc.). Increased scale of operations will also 
require some stable forms for governing of marketing such as cooperation or tight contracts 
with dairy and meat processing industries.  
A process of consolidation and modernization will be taking place in some of 
horticultural farms as well. In years to come market, contract, and institutional uncertainty 
will be steadily diminishing while access to public support programs augmenting with 
                                                 
29 Tobacco producers have a significant political representation and enjoy essential public support - 
price guarantee, subsidies on products, quality etc. 
30 That is a special (“third”) form of opportunism which occurs in development of larger 
organizations. Here individual benefits are often not proportional to individual efforts. That is why 
everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for organizational development while benefiting 
("free riding") from the new organization (Olson 1965). 
31 Farm managers older than 45 and 65 are 85% and 40% accordingly (MAF 2004). 
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application of the CAP. That will further increase sustainability of smaller-scale intensive 
family operators. In some cases, small partnership or group farming modes will be also used 
to achieve a rapid capital and labor concentration.  
Tobacco farms are concentrated in mountainous and less-developed regions with little 
farmland and no alternative job opportunities. They will continue to enjoy a high public 
support (political power, preferential regional support policies), which will keep their high 
sustainability and bring no significant changes in modes of organization (specialized small-
scale family operation).  
The increasing competition will be inevitably connected with further decrease in the 
number of small commercial farms - boost in joint ventures, failures, or non-market 
orientation. Furthermore, there will be a parallel tendency toward specialization into 
productions for “niche markets” and products with special quality (specific origins, organic 
products, eggs from freely-breed chicken, meat with low fat level, grape for special wines 
etc.). All they will increase competitiveness of a good part of the adaptive small enterprises. 
Besides, that would require enhanced contract and/or complete vertical integration 
(“integrated” management) with processing industries, food chains, and exporting companies. 
Finally, some EU support measures (market support, agro-environmental programs etc.) 
require a farming organization which would increase incentives for association among small-
scale producers. The cooperation among the competing small farms will be further fostered by 
the potential to meet new market and institutional requirements, decrease market uncertainty 
and unilateral dependency (monopoly in upstream or downstream industries), and  save costs 
for common organization of certain transactions (e.g. innovation, product and technology 
certification, price negotiation, inputs supply, processing, marketing of output etc.)  
 
4. Modes of Governance of Commercial Farms 
 
4.1. Governing of land supply 
 
There is a significant distinction in forms for land supply in different type farms (Figure 
1). The ownership is a major governing mode for most unregistered and smaller-size farms 
while leasing is a dominant form in large agro-firms and cooperatives. There is a tendency 
with enlargement of the farm size to increase the portion of leased land. Hence, the lease-in 
contract has been the main form for the extension of cultivated land in Bulgarian farms. 
Our survey also demonstrates that a main form for acquisition of land property in all 
types of farms is “ownership restoration, inheritance, or getting as a present”. Only a forth 
of surveyed farms has acquired ownership on agricultural land through “purchase” with a 
significant share of the larger farms participated in such transactions.  
The acquisition of ownership rights (purchase of land) is an alternative form of land 
supply to lease-in transactions (the later purchase only the “cultivation rights”). The former 
mode is associated with significant capital investments (for paying land price, preparation of 
papers and formal registration of deals), and efforts (for finding good land plots, checking out 
and securing purchase provisions etc). Besides, it allows a low flexibility in optimization of 
farm size through reallocation of land plots and/or quick emergency sell. Despite that, it is 
often a preferable mode since it gives a reliable protection of long-term investments in land 
against possible opportunism of outside landlord (e.g. termination of lease contract before the 
end of the effective life-span of invested specific capital). Our survey proves that land supply 
trough procurement of ownership governs transactions only if there is condition of high 
mutual (or unilateral) dependency of assets with adjoint land plots. All farms applying that 
mode indicate using purchased land for buildings, orchard and vineyard, irrigation or other 
long-term amelioration of land. When there is no assets dependency and/or cite-specificity of 
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investments to a land plot is insignificant, then either short lease or middle-term lease-in 
contracts are the most effective forms for extension of farm operations (less capital intensive 
or one season crop productions). 
 
 Figure 1:  Governing of land supply in Bulgarian farms 
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 Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
 
For all farms the lease-in contact has been a dominant form for farm extension through 
integration of new land plots. One of the reasons for preferences to this mode for 
organization of transactions is the unsettled property rights on farmland (lack of notary 
certificates, uncompleted land division process, disputed rights between claimants or heirs 
etc.). Another principal factor for importance of this form for land supply is its comparative 
efficiency for the individual farm: firstly, land lease requires less direct investment in 
comparison with a land purchase. The economies on capital investments has been a crucial 
factor for preferences to the lease mode in the transitional conditions of significant lack of 
own funding, and extremely high costs for credit financing, and absence of public programs 
for land procurement32. Secondly, this form allows a greater flexibility for rapid optimization 
of farms size along with current market and technological changes (e.g. quick inclusion or 
exclusion from operation of needed land plots). Third, it permits inexpensive verification 
(“production test”) of the real values of a particular land for the certain farm. Thus it restricts 
the risk in case of bad deals (e.g. unsuitable partners or land plots) to the contracted period. 
Forth, in some instances (e.g. mono culture) that is the best form for annual (or seasonal) 
supply of divers new land plots to any alternative modes (such as purchase, exchange, group 
farming, and crop rotation). Finally, until recently the lease contract was one on the two 
legitimate ways to acquire rights on farming the land by foreigners (second to the joint 
venture with a local citizen).  
                                                 
32 While short-term (and most recently) long-term public credits are becoming available through 
various support programs (SFA, SAPARD), for participating in public projects there is an explicit 
requirement “to possess the necessary farmland”.   
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The continuous land supply through a lease mode increases the relative costs of 
transactions. That is determined by the high recurrence of deals for supply of a particular 
amount of land (needs for constant renegotiations for the same plots after end of leased 
period), and costs for resolution of possible conflicts with land owners etc. However, these 
expenses are negligible comparing to the additional benefits of that governing form. Here 
market for short lease (competition) and long-lasting relationships between counterparts 
regulate satisfactorily transactions. Besides, standard lease contracts are usually offered by a 
farm to numerous land owners which minimize contracting costs. However, when a 
significant farm-specific long-term investment in land are to be made (such as long-term 
improvement, permanent tree, building etc.), then a special form is designed to safeguard 
land supply from possible opportunism of partner - e.g. use of long-lease contract, acquisition 
of ownership, joint venture with landlord etc. Furthermore, one-third of lease-in contracts are 
with relatives and familiar farmers and mainly personal (rather than anonymous market) 
relationships govern transacting. The later form, based on personal ties, is preferred since: it 
permits an efficient information exchange (in respect to demand and supply, partner’s 
reliability), cooperation in contracting and dispute resolution, and low cost control (self-
control) in respecting contractual terms. Besides, leasing business and cooperative farms is 
often provider of job and services for landlords. These interlinks additionally diminishes any 
opportunistic behavior in land deals.    
A majority of surveyed farms give preferences to “share rent” contract, and that 
portion is higher for unregistered and cooperative farms, and small and middle-size farms. 
That means that a risk from market prices and/or yields fluctuations is split between the farm 
entrepreneur and landlord. “Fix-rent” is the most desirable for 30% of the farms, as firms 
and large farms favor more that risk-taking arrangement. Besides, large farms and 
cooperatives tend to sign written contracts while other farms apply oral (informal) lease. 
The most common reasons for size reduction (through land sells-off or lease-out) in 
surveyed farms are: “lack of gain from land cultivation”, “accumulation of funds for 
financing other activities”, “impossibility to manage all owned land”, and “ceasing some 
activities”. That proves that a main factor for the reduction of scale of land supply is the high 
level of transaction costs for organization of farmland within the farm borders. The 
management of outside deals (sell-off or lease-out contracts) is much more economical than 
internal integration through hiring of new workers, providing necessary finance, and 
organizing new activities on available lands. Farms restricting the internal land supply either 
minimize the farm size or extend the farm through organization of land-saving transactions 
(e.g. intensive crops, livestock operations, agricultural services etc.). 
Land deals are not only a means for changing the farm size but also a way for 
rationalization of land organization. Our survey indicates that more than 40% of leasing-out 
farms simultaneously take part in lease-in transactions. Every tenth of leasing-in farms also 
lease-out land. Not small portion of farms applying other forms for land supply (such as 
purchase, sell, lease out, lease in) at the same time practice “compensating” opposite deals 
(sell, purchase, lease-in, lease-out). Thus in a situation of a significant portioning (scattering) 
of land ownership in the country the trade with rights on agricultural land has been a major 
way for consolidation of land plots. 
 
4.2. Governing of labor supply 
 
Different type of farms employ unlike modes for labor supply. Large cooperative and 
business farms use most of the hired labor while small and unregistered farms rely 
predominately on own and family labor (Figure 2). 
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 Figure 2:  Modes for labor supply in Bulgarian farms 
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Family labor has significant advantages comparing both with outside labor supply 
(service supply contract), and internal organization of hired labor (market based employment 
contract). Family members are unified by common business and family interests. That creates 
strong incentives for cooperation in decision making, reviling information, conflict 
resolution, and self-controlling the opportunistic behavior. That is why the effective limits for 
extension of small and unregistered farms through labor supply are mostly determined by the 
possibility to carry out “critical operations” by own or family labor.  
An employment of the cooperative members is a major form for labor supply for 
cooperatives and that is because of the existence of most of them is to provide employment 
for their members. The cooperative labor contains additional incentives for intra-farm 
realization since it participates in (share) ownership, and in the management, and in the final 
distribution of coops assets. That mode of labor coalition is especially effective when the 
number of members of the cooperative (group farm) is not very big, and most of them are 
working-owners in the coalition, and there are effective mechanisms for linking individual 
contribution to final results of the team work.   
Hiring (employment) contracts is a major mode for labor supply in large agri-firms and 
cooperatives. Internal labor contract is an alternative form for farm extension to outside 
(market) contract for service supply. That mode possesses a number of transacting 
advantages such as: economy of costs for multiple negotiations and detailed specification of 
obligations; protecting transactions from possible opportunism in critical (labor demanding) 
moments; opportunity for effective investment in farm specific human capital etc. That mode 
for farm enlargement is often preferred because of the undeveloped (missing or unstable) 
market for agrarian services, or the high potential for profiting on internally organized 
specific human capital (e.g. investing in learning by doing experience, training etc.). 
A dominant part of surveyed farms uses labor in production. The portion of farms 
which employ labor for coordination and controlling of various (internal and external) 
transactions of the farm is significant: accordingly 71% in administration and 63% in 
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management. The share of cooperatives and agro-firms, and middle-size and large farms 
which use their labor in that way is particularly high. Besides, in firms and large farms the 
portion of workforce in management and administration is slightly above 4% while for other 
farms it is much higher. That demonstrates that governance efficiency in large farms and 
agro-firms (measured through direct relative costs for management and administration) is 
comparatively higher than in unregistered and cooperative farms. A significant part of farms 
utilizes labor for security (protection from internal and outside stealing, and expropriation of 
property): 25% of the unregistered and small farms, 71% of the cooperatives and 94% of the 
firms.  
In many instances, the outside employment of labor comes to be an alternative for 
outside supply of agrarian inputs – e.g. buying instead of producing feed for animals, buying 
machinery and “replacing labor” etc. Reason for selecting that form for transacting is to be 
sleeked again in the lower relative costs. In some cases, that is either “impossibility” to find a 
reliable supplier, or the high risk from strong dependency of farm from outside providers 
(e.g. forage supply for animals), or the necessity for finding an “expensive” credit for market 
procurement of inputs etc. In other instances, grounds for choosing the internal mode is the 
availability of required non-human assets (e.g. land, machinery) for intra-farm organization 
of transactions or existence of strong interdependence (specificity) of different farm assets 
which require an integration.  
Finally, the outside labor supply is an alternative for a lease-out contract of available 
(owned, rented etc.) land33. In this case the farm size is reduced through (partial or full) 
transfer of land management to another farm entrepreneur.  
A permanent employment is a main form for labor organization in all type of farms – 
around 80% of unregistered farms, and almost all cooperatives and firms apply that mode of 
labor supply. Permanent (labor) contract with a particular farm assumes a high frequency of 
transactions between a farm entrepreneur and a worker. It allows realization of considerable 
economies on governing of labor supply. Instead of constant negotiation each activity 
(service supply contract, “daily” hiring etc), the manager and worker sign a permanent labor 
contract. In that way costs for permanent (re)negotiations, finding “good” workers, and 
testing labor’s skills and reliability, are saved. Besides, a high recurrence of transacting 
between same parties (permanent contact) let developing “good” relationships between 
partners (“getting to know each other”, mutual efforts to avoid or overcome conflicts etc.), 
and creates incentives to invest in farm specific human capital (getting knowledge about 
specific quality of different land plots, learning technology for specific products on farm, 
intimate acquaintance with animals etc.). The permanent employment also allows avoiding 
the risk of uncertainty in labor market (e.g. shortage of highly qualified labor) which is 
significant in farming in some activities and (pick) periods of time. Permanent labor accounts 
for more than a half in the average annual workforce in surveyed farms, and it is typical in 
small, unregistered and cooperative farms.    
Almost tree-forth of farms apply seasonal supply of labor. That is a caused by the 
“seasonal” character of (some) activities in farming. Here needed labor for extension of 
farms in such periods is secured by a temporary (short-term) contract. That mode allows 
flexibility in accordance with the internal necessities of the farm enlargement, and saves the 
costs for a permanent contract.  Bigger farms, cooperatives and firms use to a greater extend 
that mode for labor organization.  
                                                 
33 Namely that relationship between labor supply and land supply, and incentives, costs minimizing, 
and risk bearing futures of these “alternative forms of land tenure” has been traditionally examined by 
the agrarian economy.  
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For governing relations with different kind of hired labor diverse type of contracts are 
usually used. A written contract is the major form for hiring permanent labor in all 
cooperative and firms. Unwritten agreement for employing is practiced by unregistered and 
smaller farms. The written form gives a greater transparency and security of employment 
relations as well as an opportunity to use a third party for resolution of possible conflicts 
between parties (e.g. court, local authority etc.). However, a formal permanent employment 
contract is associated with additional costs for: preparation, juridical consultations, writing 
down the terms, (in some cases) notary registration, compulsory payments (off-limit works, 
leaves of absence, social security etc.), and termination (redundancy compensations). That is 
why it is not preferred mode by smaller farms. 
The personality of laborer is of particular importance in hiring contracts. Most hired 
labor for permanent work are “relatives or close friends”. For seasonal labor there are also 
preferences to “person who is known prior to hiring” and “renovation of contracts with the 
same person every time”. In close rural communities “everybody knows everybody” and 
built reputation (“good” or “bad” employers, workers) is a principal factor for minimizing 
labor supply costs. 
An analysis of the dominant forms of labor compensation for hired workers in different 
farms shows that they depend on the character of activity. When individual contribution of 
hired labor is difficult to measure then time-based (monthly or daily) compensation is used 
(e.g. for employees in management, administration, security). In these cases, additional 
mechanisms for controlling reliability of work are also applied (e.g. direct monitoring and 
control, employment of division managers etc.). For permanent workers various forms for 
connecting labor compensation with final (annual, overall) productivity is commonly applied. 
The later mode increases incentives for amelioration of the overall efficiency of organization 
(through mutual control and self-control) turning hired labor in a co-owner of the final output 
(and a bearer of the entrepreneurial risk).   
When labor productivity is relatively easy to measure (standardized and routine 
activities) and there is a strong link with individual efforts then an output based 
compensation of labor is typically applied (e.g. livestock and services). The hiring of labor 
under such payment mode contains strong incentives for increasing efficiency and self-
restricting opportunism. In fact it is very close to a service supply contract. 
 
4.3. Governing of service supply 
 
The share of farms using an “own supply” of major agrarian services is significant 
(Table 4). Larger operators benefit from integration of services through an exploration of 
size and scale economies on specialized and/or specific investments. What is more, very 
often an outside (market) supply of farm services is “too expensive” because of the 
undeveloped markets of specialized services (high market prices, monopoly supply, missing 
markets), and a high risk from dependency from an external supply of “critical” (in terms of 
time of delivery, quantity, and quality) activities.  
When a technological economy of scale and scope from investment in specialized assets 
is impossible to be explored within a farm boundaries, then a special (private) organization for 
supply is used (e.g. cooperation, group supply etc.). Many needy small-scale farms can not 
develop or participate in such organization (unaffordable development or maintenance costs) 
and these transactions either fail to occur or they are not carried in an effective scale. All that 
has significant negative implications for many smaller-scale farms in terms of complying with 
modern labor, quality, technological, environmental, and animal welfare standards. Principally, 
overuse of manual labor and low labor (safety, intensity etc.) standards, employment of animal 
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power and primitive technologies, insufficient compensation of intakes of chemicals, shortage 
of disease and pest protection, low yields etc., all they are common.   
Our study demonstrates that a significant part of surveyed farms still use no major 
services at all. More than 40% of unregistered farms, two-third of agro-firms, and one-quarter 
of cooperatives report they do not apply services for supply of “technological knowledge and 
advice”. More than a third of unregistered farms, one-fifth of agro-firms, and some portion of 
coops do not use “mechanization services”. A half of unregistered farms and majority of the 
small farms do not employ services for “maintenance of machinery and equipment”. Almost a 
third of unregistered and small crop farms do not use service for “spreading chemicals and 
pesticides”. “Veterinary services” are not employed by one-third of unregistered livestock 
farms and more than one-fifth of livestock firms. “Lack of outside supplier”, “high price for 
outside procurement”, “problems with contracting outside service supply”, and “quality 
problems of outside supply”, all they are indicated as main reasons for not applying these 
services. The modest intensification of Bulgarian farms has some positive effect as well. Small 
horticulture farmers enjoy a high demand of their output because of the consumers’ perception 
for (semi) “organic” character of products, and usage of traditional technologies and varieties 
etc. 
 
Table 4:       Governing of service supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Service 
type 
Modes Unregi-
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro-
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large
Own supply 24 49 65 15 28 90 
Own cooperative 5 7 15 15 20 0 
Technological 
knowledge and 
advises Market supplier 13 10 25 35 33 45 
Own supply 18 85 60 5 75 100 Mechanization 
services Own cooperative 22 0 18 50 37 0 
 Market supplier 15 15 28 35 28 9 
Own supply 80 90 100 90 100 100 
Own cooperative 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance of 
machinery and 
equipment Market supplier 20 10 0 15 10 0 
Own supply 40 65 60 45 85 100 
Own cooperative 15 7 12 25 0 0 
Spreading 
chemicals and 
pesticides Market supplier 12 25 28 22 25 0 
Own supply 20 60 40 0 0 60 Veterinary 
services Own cooperative 5 0 0 0 0 0 
 Market supplier 40 40 60 25 85 40 
Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
The amount of market supply of agrarian services is not significant and varies according 
to type of farms and kind of services. Outside service supply (purchase of service) is an 
alternative form for the internal organization of labor (“own production of services”). That 
mode of farm extension is usually used for standardized and less specific to a farm operations 
(plugging, spreading of chemicals etc.). Here contracting and controlling (output assessment) 
of service supply do not require high costs, and maximum scale and scope economies are 
realized through specialized service market. Most farms report that the frequency of using the 
same supplier is high which minimize the costs of their relations (building reputation, 
confidence, system for coordination and stimulation, self-restriction of opportunism, 
standardization of transactions etc.) and intensifies bilateral transactions. Alternatively, hiring 
and internal utilization of labor would involve additional costs for: organization and 
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monitoring of workforce, “training” of labor, social payments (insurance, redundancy), and 
compensation in non-working holidays, rainy days, and out of season periods. Besides, inter-
farm organization would be associated with a necessity to supply (through purchase or lease) 
of specialized machinery and other material assets for carrying out such services.  
 
4.4. Governing of inputs supply 
 
An internal supply (“on farm making”) is practiced by a good number of farms for 
essential inputs such as seeds and seedlings in crop farms, and forage for animals and breeding 
of animals in livestock farms (Table 5). The internal organization of inputs supply is an 
alternative mode to outside procurement (through purchase or leasing) of assets, and/or outside 
service supply. Any restriction of a market supply of farm specific assets is a result of the high 
transaction costs associated with uncertainty and risk of price dynamics and/or availability of 
inputs in a needed time; difficulties in quality verification of seeds and forage; monopoly or 
another dependency from a supplier etc. Besides, a part of the machinery (tractors, combines 
etc.) and productive animals are either highly specific to a farm (strong mutual dependency 
with other farm assets) or especially needed in particular “critical” periods (harvest, milking 
etc.). A collective organization for inputs supply is also used in order to protect dependent 
transactions and achieve possible economy of scale and scope. 
Market procurement is predominately applied for standardized inputs such as chemicals, 
machineries, and livestock. Those are mass products, with a secure supply, and an occasional 
purchase. There are multiple (alternative) suppliers and market competition works well to 
govern supply effectively. Besides, a high frequency of deals with the same suppliers is 
common which reduce transacting costs and restrict opportunisms. 
For a good part of surveyed farms a major factor for choosing a particular inputs 
supplier (with an exception for animals) is “delayed (portion) payments”. That mode 
effectively interlinks inputs supply with a credit supply to a farmer. Short and long-term 
investments in agriculture usually require a longer pay-back period (at least until the next 
harvest season). Therefore, a delayed or fraction payment for outside input supply actually 
represents a parallel lending of a free or low interest (short or long-term) credit by a supplier. 
Such interlinked organization (“input supply plus crediting”) facilitates transactions, minimize 
the overall costs for their management, and intensify inputs supply and relationships between 
counterparts. A supply of material assets “in package” with crediting (“loan in kind”) is 
beneficial for farms since: it either saves own finance of significant capital investments; or 
economize costs for finding and servicing an outside loan (from a commercial bank or another 
private agent). In a situation of vast shortage of own sources and a high costs for external 
credit supply, that is often the only available form for the enlargement (or preservation) of 
farm size. Not rare such an interlinked supply of long-term assets in fact represents leasing 
(rent) rather than a sell of actives. That specific form for governing of transactions with inputs 
supply industries corresponds to development of a particular lease market for more universal 
and easy to supervise assets (such as large machinery, building etc.)34. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 At the same time, similar lease market does not emerge for productive animals since lease contract 
is difficult to monitor (livestock could be easily consumed or resold). Therefore, purchase is the major 
form for outside supply of livestock.   
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Table 5:      Governing of inputs supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Inputs type Supplier Unregi-
stered 
Coope-
ratives
Agro-
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Chemicals Own production 17 0 0 17 0 0 
 Own cooperative 10 5 15 10 35 0 
 Market supplier 55 95 90 68 90 95 
 Buyer of farm output 24 13 33 15 25 15 
Own production 47 53 33 50 57 25 
Own cooperative 3 15 23 3 28 0 
Seeds and 
seedlings 
(crop farms) Market supplier 50 32 45 68 59 45 
 Buyer of farm output 4 41 44 4 45 28 
Own production 55 65 50 75 60 72 
Own cooperative 0 0 35 0 30 0 
Market supplier 45 35 15 25 28 12 
Forage 
(livestock 
farms) 
Buyer of farm output 9 6 53 9 35 30 
Machinery Own production 12 13 0 12 5 5 
 Own cooperative 20 17 46 12 15 28 
 Market supplier 68 70 54 90 85 90 
 Buyer of farm output 15 0 19 15 14 15 
Livestock Own production 37 50 28 55 35 24 
 Own cooperative 21 31 33 35 58 0 
 Market supplier 42 19 39 45 45 50 
 Buyer of farm output 40 17 13 12 35 28 
Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
 
 Figure 3:  Share of farms selecting suppliers for "delayed payment" reason 
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“Receiving additional benefit(s)” is another important factor for selecting a particular 
supplier for some of the new chemicals and machineries. Suppliers usually provides “free” 
non-material assets or services like training, know-how, technical advise, maintenance etc. 
Since the appropriability of these transaction is low (non material character), the “package 
deal” with the main material input is the only effective modes for effective organization.  
For a considerable number of farms “inputs supplier buys farm output”. That 
interlinked organization of inputs supply with marketing of farm output (“reciprocial 
supply”) minimizes overall governance costs for two groups of transacting (a single contract 
for input supply and marketing). In many cases, this mode extends vertical coordination 
(quasi integration) of farms with the supplier of a particular input (e.g. super elite seeds). In 
other instances, there is a mutual (e.g. capacity) inter-dependency and a buyer of farm 
produce (e.g. milk or meat processor, dealer) organizes supply of a critical input (e.g. forage 
for livestock) in order to secure the origin, high quality, quantity, and time of delivery of the 
raw material.  
 
4.5. Governing of finance supply 
 
A major form for funding the activities of Bulgarian farms is “own sources” (Table 6). 
In transitional conditions of high institutional, market, and behavioral uncertainty most of the 
traditional agrarian investments happen to be in a regime of high specificity (“berried in 
land”). Besides, much of the human and intangible capital is highly specific to a particular 
farm (e.g. investment in training, learning by doing experience, organizational development, 
building reputation etc.). Therefore, finding out an independent (market) investor to finance 
such assets has been quite expensive (costs to find a supplier, efforts to negotiate loan terms, 
losses associated with meeting collateral requirements, premium interest rate or other “side 
payments”) or even impossible35. Consequently, the internal rather than outside mode has 
been the most effective (or only possible) way to finance transactions supported by such 
assets (Bachev 2000).  
Table 6:    Governing of finance supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Supplier Type of 
funding 
Unregi- 
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro- 
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Own financing Short-term 91 81 79 91 81 75 
 Long-term 49 48 55 62 40 62 
Relatives and Short-term 31 7 10 23 14 12 
friends Long-term 20 0 23 6 19 0 
Inputs supplier Short-term 22 27 28 25 25 35 
 Long-term 31 23 34 28 28 33 
Outside investor Short-term 0 11 13 0 3 20 
 Long-term 0 0 17 0 3 25 
Farm organization Short-term 13 16 7 29 19 9 
 Long-term 14 4 14 11 14 0 
Commercial bank Short-term 6 18 38 3 31 25 
 Long-term 3 11 23 0 19 0 
Short-term 11 56 62 20 52 75 Public program 
Long-term 7 19 22 7 21 25 
Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
                                                 
35 That proves Williamson suggestion that when specificity of investment increases, then the internal 
and outside financing are not alternative modes (“perfect substitute”), and equity or internal supply is 
the only possible way to finance such assets (Williamson, 1996).  
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Besides, investment in internal farm-specific assets (such as entrepreneurship, know-
how etc.) has been much more productive since it brings higher than market36 return on 
invested specialized capital. That is why large farms and firms (which tend to perform much 
more effectively) invest to a greater extend their capital in own long-term assets for 
increasing productivity. Finally, production for household consumption in individual (family) 
farms and a good part cooperatives activities are also effectively funded by own resources 
(household savings, advance payments of members for cooperative services etc.). However, 
internal sources for funding are limited by family savings, coop members specific demands, 
(internal) profit generation capacity etc. That puts a severe restriction on effective farm 
enlargement through an internal finance supply.  
Using of “relatives and friends” as external suppliers of capital was very popular 
during first years of transition. When uncertainty was so high that personal ties (trust) 
governed most economic transactions at national and even at transnational scales (Bachev 
and Tsuji, 2001). This mode for outside supply is still dominant for a good part of small and 
unregistered farms. Here costs for negotiating, enforcement, and disputing are low since 
transactions are governed by “good-will” and personal trust between partners (usually as a 
part of a broader friendships or family relationships). In certain cases, such outside “support” 
of activities of smaller farms is a part of interlinked “direct marketing” deals. That allows 
creditors to avoid uncertainty associated with price fluctuation, inconsistent supply, and 
quality, safety and origin of produce.  
Share of farms which get a financial supply from an outside investor is still low. 
Evolution of a special private mode for external funding of farming is determined by strong 
relation specificity of farm investments to outside counterpart. That is either bilateral 
(capacity, time of delivery) or most often unilateral dependency of farm assets from a 
particular buyer (processor, retailer, and exporter). For the reason of high specificity of 
investments to a particular (single) buyer they hardly could be financed by an independent 
supplier (high risk from opportunism in post-investment stage). Farms also would not make 
dependent investments unless they are safeguarded by an effective governing form (e.g. a 
long-term contract, taking economic “hostages”, and join investment). Therefore, either 
underinvestment in specialized capital (hold-up) or direct external (coo) investment by an 
interested vertical partner. A range of special contract modes have been effectively employed 
to mitigate funding difficulties (e.g. shortage of working capital) or facilitate mutual 
dependent relations with buyers and suppliers: delayed payments for inputs supply (zero 
interest “loan in kind”), interlinking credit with inputs supply and marketing, leasing or 
accepting outside investment (hostage taking, joint ownership) of long-term assets etc. In 
some cases, farms have been initiated (or taken over) from outside (off-farm) interests and 
developed as a part of diversification strategy of special business groups.  
A collective organization for outside finance supply (national or regional professional 
or crediting organization) is used by an insignificant number of farms. The cooperative form 
is more important for short-term financial needs of smaller farms. Despite its obvious 
advantages (rapid resource accumulation, risk sharing, non-for-profit operation, crediting 
preferences, “democratic” management) evolution of a collective mode for finance supply 
has been very difficult. That has been because of the “free riding” problem, inefficiency of 
                                                 
36 E.g. rates of interest on bank deposits return of shares at actions market, or pay-back on 
Government bonds etc. 
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the cooperative form, revealed mismanagement, existing institutional restrictions, and low 
investment capacity of the potential members37.  
Market (credit, debt) finance procurement has been effectively developing after 2000 
but it is still not accessible for the majority of farms. Larger farms and firms employ to a 
greater extent loan contracts. That is because they can better meet market criteria for 
efficiency and formal (interest, collateral) requirements, and have a superior ability to face 
significant costs for finding a creditor and completing credit agreements. Share financing of 
investment project with bank loan and debtor’s co-funding is commonly used.  Own sources 
are usually used for funding of more farm-specific assets (e.g. land and land improvement) 
while credit resources are directed to finance more universal (liquid) assets and activities. In 
the later case machineries and/or “future yield” are used effectively as guarantee which 
facilitates crediting transactions.   
A main form for external short-term funding in larger cooperative and business farms is 
“some kind of public program”. Agrarian credit market was blocked until recently and a 
Government intervention in financing of working capital in some productions (mainly 
cereals) made activities possible. Major beneficiaries of the preferential long-term programs 
are also larger business enterprises. They have better experience and capacity to prepare good 
project proposals, and meet formal requirements, and deal with complicated paper work, and 
develop relation-specific capital with funding agencies (personal ties, good reputation), and 
“arrange” selection of projects (lobbying, interlinking, “under the counter” payments) etc.  
Since the beginning of transition now there have been a number of EU, international 
assistance, NGO`s etc. initiatives targeting modernization of farming and rural areas (e.g. 
SAPARD); less developed regions; minority groups; young farmers etc. All these forms for 
international intervention has come to “fill a gap” when internal third party (Government) 
involvement in farm finance supply either failed (capacity and competence deficiency, lack 
of budget recourses) or has not been quite efficient (bad planning, mismanagement, 
corruption).  
Generally, the high transacting costs restrict (or block) the market and private funding 
of majority of farms, and an effective public involvement in finance supply has not been put 
in place. Accordingly, chronicle underinvestment, and limits of farm enlargement and 
productivity; and rising disparity in income, technological level, and competitiveness, and 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, all they are typical among farms.  
 
4.6. Governing of insurance supply 
 
During much of the transition Bulgarian farms had no access to specialized insurance 
products since they were either unavailable or too expensive (Bachev 2000). Agrarian 
insurance market has been developing in last several years but it is not widely used by farms 
(Table 7). The only exception is insuring against “bad meteorological conditions” (hail, frost 
etc.), and “fires and natural disaster” which are practiced by a great number of large 
cooperative and business farms. These insurance products are also regularly purchased by a 
portion of larger fruits and grape farms.    
The larger farms have stronger incentives to sell the risk because they are highly 
specialized huge operators, and in the case of an event damages are significant. Besides, they 
have bigger financial means to insure crops and related assets. In some cases, they are in 
                                                 
37 A number of farm credit organizations have been initiated by private interest groups (consortiums of 
banks, inputs suppliers, breading and innovation centers etc.) or by a third party (Government, 
international assistance program, NGO). Consequently, they have got a significant back up by the 
external public or private funding.  
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position to negotiate more favorable terms than bulk of the farms (big contracting power, 
economy of scale, available on farm experts etc.).  
Moreover, “purchase of insurance” is usually explicitly requests by the crediting banks 
(for commercial or public crediting programs). The main users of short-term (bank, 
Government) credits are big cereals farms. Similarly, for long-term credits are mostly taken 
by larger grain, fruits and grape producers. Since the risk of crop failure is immense the 
lending banks require their collateral (future yields, milking-cows) to be protected 
(“insured”) from possible losses. Despite certain unwillingness to do so, farmers have to pay 
the supplementary price for insurance supply in order to obtain needed (“interlinked”) bank 
credit. In this case risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance company rather 
than bank) and debtor-farms are charged with extra (transaction) costs to assure a bank loans.      
Table 7:         Governing of insurance supply in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Objects Type of insurance Unregi-
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro-
firms
Small Middle 
size 
Large
Grain Burglary 6 14 0 6 5 13 
 Bad meteorological 
conditions 
19 61 72 28 55 81 
 Diseases and pests 6 21 19 3 30 0 
 Fires and natural disasters 31 71 88 38 75 81 
Vegetables Burglary 0 0 6 0 5 0 
 Bad meteorological 
conditions 
6 0 13 6 0 25 
 Diseases and pests 3 0 0 3 0 0 
 Fires and natural disasters 3 7 0 3 5 0 
Burglary 19 0 22 19 16 0 Fruits and 
grape Bad meteorological 
conditions 
3 32 22 3 27 25 
 Diseases and pests 16 18 3 19 11 0 
 Fires and natural disasters 3 25 22 3 23 25 
Burglary 9 36 30 8 28 67 Meat 
animals Bad meteorological 
conditions 
0 7 5 0 8 0 
 Diseases and pests 0 14 15 4 8 33 
 Fires and natural disasters 0 29 0 0 16 0 
Burglary 0 21 50 0 36 67 Milk 
animals Bad meteorological 
conditions 
9 7 0 8 4 0 
 Diseases and pests 9 29 15 12 16 33 
 Fires and natural disasters 0 43 0 0 24 0 
Others Burglary 0 7 0 0 5 0 
 Diseases and pests 3 0 0 3 0 0 
 Fires and natural disasters 8 14 0 11 7 0 
Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
The rest of the farms use other forms to insure their products and assets such as: 
diversification of production, geographical remoteness of individual plots, hiring full-time 
specialists (e.g. pest control expert, agronomist), using private security guards etc. In 
Bulgaria there is not an effective public system (police, municipal guards, court etc.) for 
protection and recovery of (“absolute rights”) and punishment of offenders. Farmers are 
among the most vulnerable for individual thieves and organized crimes since much of the 
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farm output and property is “in the open”, and dispersed in wide areas and many locations. 
Therefore, agrarian property is widely assured by private modes and “costs for protection” 
for all farms are significant (in terms of time and resources spent, hired security guards and 
services, “payments for property protection and restoration” etc.).  
A good number of small farms do not use any public (collective) modes for insuring 
risk and face constantly severe hazards (and damages). The main reasons for avoiding market 
supply of insurance are high (unaffordable) premiums, unfavorable terms of contracts (not 
tailored to particular conditions of an individual farm), and low satisfaction from the services 
of commercial insurance providers (frequent disputes about the terms of contracts and extend 
of the harms, lengthy delay for payment of damages etc.). Consequently, a great part of 
farming resources and activities is not assured (insuring labor is practically absent, most 
animal, machineries and buildings are uncovered etc.), and a considerable majority of 
farmers bear the entire risk of failures. 
Despite the potential efficiency (non-for-profit organization, members orientation, 
tailoring products to farms needs) the collective modes for farm insurance have not evolved 
in the country. Here the high transaction costs for initiation and development (“free riding” 
problem), and conflicting interests of different farms etc. impedes that process. Moreover, an 
effective public intervention has not been undertaken to assist (initiate, support, legislate) 
farmers in organization of (“quasi-public”, “quasi-private”) mode for collective supply of 
agrarian insurance. Neither badly needed guarantee and/or compensation fund has been 
launched. Subsequently, a good part of affected smaller and middle-size farms (having little 
internal capacity to bear yield failures and property damages) experience severe looses, and 
see the scale of their operations (assets, financial means) and welfare further decreased. 
 
4.7. Governing of marketing 
 
In marketing of farm output classical trade across market (business with a market 
agent, a wholesale market trade) is broadly used (Table 8). That form is frequently employed 
for marketing of vegetables, grains, and meat from all type of crop and livestock farms. Here 
standardization of products and technologies is higher, and thus market (“market prices”, 
quality standards, competition) governs effectively relations with downstream partners. A 
trade on formal wholesale markets is still too expensive for the majority of farms (in terms of 
distance, charges; and requirements for standardization, packaging and certification), and 
only a fraction of them regularly utilize that mode.  
When specificity of farm products to a particular buyer (processor, retailer) is high 
(special technology, quality, packaging, special time of delivery, special origin, freshens) 
then delivery contracts with a respective partner are used to tailor or protect transactions. A 
firm-processor is the major buyer for vegetables, fruits and grape, and milk for all kind of 
farms. Here a product specificity is usually coupled with a strong site-specificity (single 
buyer in the region, big capacity dependency), and frequency of transacting with a particular 
partner is high. Therefore, facilitating vertical links through direct and tight-up contracts is 
important for both sides. Recurrence of deals with “the same partner(s)” is usually high 
which restrict information asymmetry between counterparts and opportunistic behavior, 
develop mutual trust, necessitate special mechanisms for harmonizing relations (modes of 
payment, guarantee, control and dispute resolution, interlinking marketing with finance 
and/or inputs supply), and diminish the overall transacting costs. 
Some type of collective organization (a general or marketing cooperative, a group 
marketing etc.) is used only by small and middle-scale farms for marketing of fruits and 
grape. The collective mode is associated with a number of transacting benefits unachievable 
by individual farms – non-for-profit operation, economies of scale and scope on “marketing 
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activities” (e.g. saving on search, promotion, operational etc. costs), superior negotiating 
positions, interlinking with storing, transportation, retail etc. However, development and 
maintenance of a cooperative organization have been quite costly in transitional conditions. 
Therefore, that form is not widely used by the majority of farms.  
Table 8:         Governing of marketing in Bulgarian farms (percent of farms) 
Output Modes Unregi- 
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro- 
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Grain Own cooperative 9 7 9 12 11 0 
 Another farm/firm 50 85 75 56 57 81 
 Processor 25 39 37 22 27 75 
 Retail 6 7 16 0 16 13 
Vegetables Own processing 0 0 15 0 7 7 
 Another farm/firm 24 24 35 16 19 40 
 Wholesale market 6 5 15 9 25 6 
 Processor 38 66 30 19 25 40 
 Retail 12 0 6 6 2 2 
Own processing 15 7 19 15 18 25 Fruits and 
grape Own cooperative 24 7 9 13 11 0 
 Another farm/firm 48 39 32 60 23 33 
 Wholesale market 0 22 22 3 20 6 
 Processor 15 36 25 19 30 12 
 Retail 6 0 0 6 0 0 
Meat Own processing 0 10 15 0 12 15 
 Another farm/firm 65 71 80 58 70 67 
 Processor 29 43 30 30 48 33 
 Retail 15 36 10 15 36 0 
Milk Own processing 0 10 15 0 12 15 
 Another farm/firm 42 43 40 25 40 0 
 Processor 51 64 45 32 52 100 
 Retail 19 0 15 18 12 0 
Source: personal interviews with farm managers  
Intra-farm processing of farm output (internal “marketing”) is practiced by some of 
larger farms for fruits and grape, vegetables, milk and meat. Namely, a bigger operational 
size and a high frequency of transacting give an economic opportunity for internal 
exploration of inter-dependant assets (in farming and processing). On the other hand, vertical 
integration let to protect dependant investments and to pay-off from marketing of final 
(processed) products – getting full profit on final products, trade with special brand names, 
lessen market dependency (easy storage and transportation) etc.  
Retail marketing to final consumers is employed by some smaller-scale and cooperative 
farms for meat, milk, vegetables, and fruits and grape. It takes various forms - from on-spot 
“street” or “along the read” sells, through trade “on farm” or “farmers markets”, to a 
customized “home delivery”. The direct sell includes products for which quality, freshness, 
and origin are extremely important for consumers. This mode does not involve big volumes 
and serve local customers and visitors (e.g. tourists). Here a strong clientalisation often 
develops, transacting costs are insignificant, and deals are profitable for either side. In 
addition, cooperatives are traditionally used to supply basic food (e.g. meat, cheese) for their 
members and rural communities. However, in most cases directly marketed by small 
producers meat and milk do not correspond to formal hygiene and sanitary standards.   
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5. Likely Impact of EU CAP Implementation on Farm Structures 
 
5.1. Impact of CAP on economic sustainability of farms 
 
The EU integration and CAP implementation will provide new economic opportunities 
for many Bulgarian farms (Bachev 2005a, Bachev 2006). The EU funding alone, which 
agriculture will receive from 2007 on will be 5.1 times higher than the overall level of 
present support to farming. Besides, the EU accession introduces and enforces a “new order” 
(regulations, product quality and safety standards, protection against market instability, 
export support etc.)38 which will eventually increase intensity and efficiency of agrarian 
transactions. The European integration will open up huge markets enhancing competition and 
letting local farms explore fully their comparative advantages (low costs, high quality, 
specific character of produce, innovation potential). That will lead both to an expansion of 
export and presence at growing internal market of all competitive farms.  
The novel conditions of market competition and institutional restrictions will give 
strong incentives (and pressure) for new investments for increasing productivity and 
conforming to higher product and operational standards. The larger and business farms will 
benefits to a greater extend from the new institutional and market environment. These farms 
are the most sensitive to new market demand and institutional regulations since they largely 
benefit (or lose) from timely adaptation to new environment. Therefore, business farms will 
vigorously seek, find and make new investment for increasing competitiveness and meet new 
institutional requirements. On the other hand, small-scare produces and most livestock farms 
will have a hard time adapting to new competition pressure, and new food safety, 
environmental, animal-welfare etc. standards. 
A significant part of farms will be qualified to receiving direct payments from the EU39. 
During 2007-2009 all farms will get single payments according to the amount of utilized 
agricultural land40. Depending on the number of applicants and farming area the level of 
subsidies will be between 69-74.2 €/ha in 2007, 82.8-89.1 €/ha in 2008, and 96.8-104.1 €/ha 
in 2009. Besides, certain farms may get top-ups from the national budget41. Consequently, 
from 153,640 to 668,000 farms would benefit from that public support.  
In view of the current (low) level of support the direct payments will augment farm 
sustainability through increasing general (net) income or preventing its possible reduction. 
Direct payments could even induce usage of some less-productive and presently abandoned 
lands, and provide new income in certain less-favorable and mountainous regions of the 
country.  
However, this mode of public support will benefit unevenly different type of farms as a 
little more than 3% of farms (large farms, cooperatives, and agri-firms) will touch more than 
85% of the subsidies. Many effective small-scale operators (vegetables, tobacco, green-house 
etc.) will receive no or only a tiny fraction of the direct payments. Besides, specialized 
livestock farms will not be eligible to receive any payments under that scheme. Above and 
                                                 
38 EU funds allocated for market support for 2007-2009 accounts for 388 million euro (MAF). 
39 From EU for direct payments there will be available 200.3 millions, 240.4 millions, and 281 
millions for 2007, 2008 and 2009 accordingly, which corresponds to 25%, 30%, and 35% of the EU-
15 level of direct payments for relevant year. Phasing will continue until complete balancing in 2016. 
40 A minimum farms size eligible for direct payments is set on 1 ha and 0.5 ha for orchards and 
vineyards. A minimum of 0.1 ha for each parcel also applies. There is a possibility for extension of 
Single Area Payment Scheme until 2011 (MAF). 
41 Bulgaria will be in position to add the direct payments from the national budget up to 55% from the 
EU level of direct payments in 2007, 60% in 2008, 65% in 2009, and by 30% over the applicable 
levels of the relevant year since 2010 (MAF). 
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beyond, the bulk of subsidies will go to the more developed regions where the biggest farms 
and UAA are located. All these will foster disparity in income and efficiency among different 
farms, sub-sectors and regions. That would also require some sort of (coupled with 
production and region) aid to maintain income level or compensate certain producers.   
On the other hand, this method will support otherwise “inefficient” structures (e.g. 
small-scale, part-time, and co-operative farms) and non-market forms (such as subsistence 
and cooperative farming). As a result, the relative sustainability of these farms will increase - 
small scale-operations will become viable; cooperatives will be able to pay a rent; 
subsistence farming will turn to be more profitable etc. Besides, direct payments will tend to 
increase the farmland price and rent, and thus enlarge the costs for land supply in the biggest 
farms42. At the same time small-scale operators (which are mainly organized on owned land) 
will retain the entire subsidies and see their income increased. Subsequently, transformation 
of land management to the most effective forms as well as restructuring of farms will be 
delayed43.  What is more, the EU funds will be effectively used to subsidize directly the 
consumption (subsistence food self-supply) of a good part of Bulgarian population. 
Significant EU funds for rural development will be also available exceeding 4.7 times 
the relevant current level44. This amount of resources will let more and relatively smaller 
farms to get access to public support scheme and invest in modernization of enterprises. 
Furthermore, new important activities will be effectively financed such as diversification of 
farming; commercialization of local products; renovation of villages and infrastructural 
development; agri-environment protection and animal welfare; support for less-favored areas 
and regions with environmental restrictions; afforestation of farmland; restructuring of semi-
market holdings; Community standards; food quality; producers' organizations etc. All that 
will let carrying out essential activities for agriculture and rural areas - commercialization 
and diversification of farming, introduction of organic farming, maintaining productivity and 
biodiversity of currently abandoned farmland, revitalizing mountainous agriculture etc. That 
evolution will bring additional income for farmers, and create new employment in rural area, 
and increase the overall performance of individual farms. Besides, it will extend the activity 
of some of the existing structures (cooperatives, group farms, firms) which could specialize 
in new functions (such as environmental preservation, maintenance of farmland etc.), and see 
their long-term sustainability increased.  
Mostly bigger farms would be able to participate in these programs and increase their 
income. Namely these farms have superior managerial and entrepreneurial experience, and 
available resources and capital, and possibilities for adaptation to new requirements for 
quality and other standards, and potential for preparation and wining projects etc. Besides, 
the actual system of governance of public programs (prioritizing, management, control, and 
assessment) would less likely change overnight. Therefore, agrarian and rural development 
funds will likely continue to benefit exclusively the largest structures and the richest regions 
of the country; and more abuses will likely take place; and CAP support will not contribute to 
decreasing technological and income disparity between farms and regions.  
The CAP implementation will foster farms enlargement and transfer of resources to 
most viable structures. An expansion of the farm size will be required by the necessity to 
achieve an optimal (bigger) and competitive operational scale for exploring potential of new 
technologies (special quality of products, economies of scale and scope etc.). Next, a 
                                                 
42 Currently leased land comprises a half of UAA in unregistered farms and 90% of UAA in legal 
entities (MAF). 
43 That is not necessarily bad as far as keeping an extensive and a family character of farming is 
concerned. 
44 For 2007-2009 for agrarian and rural development are envisaged 733 million euro plus resources 
from the EU Structural Funds (MAF). 
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concentration of management will be needed for internal organization of inter-dependant 
assets and for exploration of possible economies on (predominantly) transaction costs – for 
effective soppy of inputs and credit, marketing, relation with agrarian bureaucracy etc. 
Finally, some minimum scale of activities will be obligatory for taking part in certain public 
support programs (marketing, agri-ecology, biodiversity, organic farming, tradition and 
cultural heritage etc.). The later would bring about extension of individual farms and/or 
evolution of group organization and cooperation.  
Farming will be increasingly characterized with domination of larger and highly 
competitive business enterprises which will concentrate activities in all sub-sectors. Most 
cooperatives will keep and extend advantages to large number of petite landowners, rural 
labor, and smaller farms. Besides, they will have greater potential to explore economy of 
scale and scope on institutionally determined investment, adapt to formal requirements for 
support, use expertise, finance and execute projects. That will extend and intensify 
transactions governed through coops mode.  
The new institutional restrictions and competition will be inevitably connected with 
decreasing the number and increasing the size of small commercial farms as a result of joint 
ventures, failures, and non-market orientation. On the other hand, only few subsistence farms 
will likely undertake market orientation and extend their present scale because of the lack of 
entrepreneurship, resources, advanced age of farmers, and insufficient demand for farm 
products. 
Our analysis on likely impact of CAP implementation on economic sustainability of 
farms is also supported by the opinion of the leading experts on farm structures in Bulgaria. 
On the Eve of EU accession we asked the experts to assess the likely short-term impact of 
CAP implementation on farms income, and investment activity of farms, and farms access to 
public support programs, and quality of products of farms, and farms size.  
Most experts believe that the introduction of CAP measures will affect positively the 
income of relatively large farms of all type as well as smaller-size mix unregistered farms, 
and crop and mix agro-firms (Table 9). At the same time, impact on income of relatively 
smaller holdings and most of livestock farms is expected to be neutral or even negative until 
2009. Furthermore, the majority of experts consider that introduction of CAP will have 
positive effect on investment activities of the bigger farms, while for other farms no any 
impact is envisaged.  
 
 Table 9:      Experts assessment of likely short-tem impact of CAP implementation on economic sustainability of Bulgarian farms (percent) 
 
Unregistered farms Agro-firms Cooperatives 
Relatively small Relatively big Relatively small Relatively big Relatively small Relatively big 
 
Impact of CAP on: 
Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock 
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock 
Mix 
Income of farms                   
Positive 43 29 57 100 71 100 57 43 57 100 71 86 43 29 43 86 57 71 
Neutral 57 43 43 0 0 0 29 29 29 0 0 14 29 29 14 14 14 29 
Negative 0 29 0 0 29 0 14 29 14 0 29 0 29 43 43 0 29 0 
Amount of investments                   
Positive 29 14 29 100 86 100 57 29 43 100 100 86 14 14 14 100 100 86 
Neutral 71 71 71 0 0 0 43 71 57 0 0 14 71 71 71 0 0 14 
Negative 0 14 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Access to public support 
programs 
                  
Positive 29 29 29 100 100 86 57 57 57 100 100 100 43 43 43 100 100 86 
Neutral 43 43 43 0 0 0 29 29 29 0 0 0 43 43 43 0 0 14 
Negative 29 29 29 0 0 14 14 14 14 0 0 0 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Products quality                    
Positive 29 43 29 57 71 71 43 57 43 71 86 86 43 71 57 71 86 86 
Neutral 71 57 71 43 29 29 57 43 57 29 14 14 57 29 43 29 14 14 
Negative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Farm size                   
Positive 43 43 29 57 71 71 71 57 43 86 86 71 43 43 29 29 29 29 
Neutral 43 29 43 29 29 14 29 29 43 0 0 14 29 29 43 57 57 57 
Negative 14 29 29 14 0 14 0 14 14 14 14 14 29 29 29 14 14 14 
Source: personal interview with the leading experts on farm structures  
 According to the experts CAP implementation will boost the access to public support 
program of relatively bigger farms. Most experts do not anticipate any significant changes in 
the mechanisms for distribution of public funds to smaller commercial farms during first 
years of CAP implementation. What is more, some of them forecast even a decrease in 
access of small unregistered farms to public funds for support. 
Estimates of experts are that introduction of mechanisms and instruments of CAP 
(higher quality standards, strong competition, enhanced public control, improved investment 
activity, improved public support) will eventually affect positively quality of products in 
bigger farms of all types. Likewise, expectations are that even relatively smaller livestock 
firms and cooperatives will be forced to adapt to superior EU quality standards and improve 
product quality. 
Judgment of experts is that during the first years of CAP the new market and 
institutional environment will bring about a progressive change in the farms size in relatively 
bigger unregistered farms and most firms (with exception of small mix firms). The 
expectations are that introduction of CAP will be associated not only with additional private 
and public investment for technological modernization of farms, but with the enlargement of 
enterprises. Assessment is that CAP implementation would not affect positively only larger 
cooperatives of all kind. Apparently, a favorable general impact of the new policy would not 
compensate the significant internal inconsistency of the cooperatives as a production 
organization. As far as the impact of CAP on size of smaller unregistered farms, 
cooperatives, and mix firms is concerned, suggestions are for preservation of existing scale 
and/or diminution of farms. It is widely expected that during first years after EU accession, 
the process of concentration of resources management into larger (and more efficient) 
unregistered farms and agro-firms will continue. Despite that, it is not anticipated a high rate 
of absolute and relative reduction of smaller farms with exception of unregistered livestock 
holdings and specialized cooperatives.  
 
5.2. Impact of CAP on environmental, social and organizational sustainability of 
farms 
 
Environmental, social and organizational dimensions are important aspects which along 
with the economic stability determine the integral sustainability of a farm. 
The CAP implementation would improve environmental performance of the farms. For 
receiving direct payments there is a mandatory requirement for farms to “keep the farmland 
in a good agricultural and environmental status”. Direct payments could even induce farming 
on currently abandoned lands45, and improve environmental situation and biodiversity. 
Furthermore, there will be a huge budget allocated for special environmental measures 
(going beyond the “good farming practices”)46. A great number of farms will have economic 
incentives to take part in various agri-environmental and animal welfare programs such as: 
organic farming, measures for environmental and biodiversity preservation and 
improvement, measures respecting animal rights and welfare etc.  
The CAP measures will affect positively environmental performance of large business 
farms. Namely these enterprises (potential big polluters) will be under constant 
administrative control for obeying new (EU) environmental and animal welfare standards. 
                                                 
45 Presently uncultivated farmland reaches 8.6% of the total agricultural land (MAF). 
46 The National Strategy Plan for Rural Development for 2007-2013 allocates budget for “preservation 
of national recourses and improvement of countryside” amounting 623.3 million euro (27.1% of the 
total funding). 
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Therefore, they will be strongly interested in transforming their activities according to the 
new eco-norms immediately after joint the EU making necessary eco-investments, changing 
production structures etc. Otherwise they would not only be unable to receive direct 
payments and take part in other support programs, but risk to be severely punished (receiving 
fines, losing licenses, ceasing activities). Moreover, larger producers will have strong 
incentives to participate in special agro-environmental and biodiversity programs, since they 
would have lower costs (great potential for economies of scale and scope) and high benefits 
(permanent rent) from such long-term public contracts. 
Nevertheless, some of the terms of the specific contracts for environment and 
biodiversity preservation, animal welfare, keeping tradition etc., all they are very difficult 
and expensive to enforce and dispute47. In Bulgaria the rate of compliance with these 
standards will be even lower because of the lack of readiness and awareness, insufficient 
control, ineffective court system, domination of “personal” relations and bribes. 
Correspondingly, more farms than otherwise would enroll will participate in such scheme 
(including the biggest polluters and offenders). Subsequently, the outcome of implementation 
of that sort of instruments would be less than the desirable (“European”) level.  
More to the point, direct costs and lost income for conforming with the requirements of 
special agri-environmental and biodiversity programs in different farms will vary 
considerably, and they will have unequal incentives to participate. Having in mind the 
voluntary character of most of the CAP support instruments we should expect that the biggest 
producers of negative externalities (large polluters and non-compliant with modern quality, 
agronomic, biodiversity, animal welfare etc. standards) will stay outside of these schemes 
since they would have the highest environment enhancement costs. On the other hand, small 
contributors will like to join since they would not command great efforts (and additional 
costs) comparing to the supplementary net benefit48. Moreover, the Government is less likely 
to set up high performance standards because of the strong internal political pressure from 
farmers and possible outside problems with the EU control (and sanctions) on cross-
compliance. Therefore, CAP implementation will probably have a modest positive impact on 
the environment performance of Bulgarian farms.  
The implementation of CAP will contribute to restructuring of commercial farms 
according to the modern market, technological, and institutional standards. A large part of 
agrarian inputs, technologies, and outputs will be having “mass” (standardized) character and 
market transacting will dominate at farm gates. Nevertheless, a specialization in productions 
for “niche markets” will also start taking place – products with special quality, specific 
origins, special technologies etc. That would require higher specific (to a particular buyer) 
investment and an “integral” management of transactions in farming, processing, retailing, 
and exporting. Besides, some diversification of enterprises into related activities (trade with 
origins, agro-tourism) as a mode for dealing with market risk should be expected. All that 
would bring about new special modes for private governance such as long-term contracts, 
collective agreements (codes of professional behavior), trilateral modes (independent third-
party certification and control), “quasi” or complete integration.  
Larger and highly effective (competitive) farms will be concentrating activities in all 
major sub-sectors. That will be positively affected by the expected boost in farming income, 
and by new opportunities for taking part in programs for development of farms and farms 
associations. At the same time, a strong price and quality competition will take out of 
                                                 
47 Low-rate of farmers’ compliance with environmental contracts is a serious problem even in some of 
the old EU members (Dupraz et al., 2004). 
48 Most activities of the small-scale farms have been highly “eco-friendly” as a result of the low 
intensification of production (Bachev 2005b).  
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business many small and middle-size crop (e.g. cereal) operators. Furthermore, many semi-
professional and professional livestock farms will be less sustainable in middle- and longer-
term because of the low productivity and not complying with the EU quality, hygiene, animal 
welfare and eco-standards. A few numbers of these farms will be able to adapt through 
specialized investment for enlargement and conforming with new institutional restrictions. 
Principally, a significant part of the “institutionally determined investments” do not generate 
income (ecology, animal welfare etc.), and there are no incentives for funding through 
commercial or public credit. Meanwhile, the EU pressure for enforcement of standards in 
market sector will increase and lead to closure or take-over of a greater part of livestock 
farms. 
However, the process of restructuring of a good part of Bulgarian farms will not be 
positively affected. Many efficient smaller-scale farms in horticulture, tobacco, and livestock 
will get insignificant or no direct payments. That will reduce their financial capability to take 
part in other public support programs, and increase differences in the comparative 
advantages. Less or unsupported farms will be unable to compete with price, quality, 
assortiment etc. with large and highly subsidized (local and European) produces, and further 
decrease their sustainability.  
At the same time, many less effective small and subsistence (cooperative and 
individual) farms will continue to persist and even benefit from the public support (direct 
payment, structural funds etc.). That will keep “viable” many less productive small-scale 
operators and cooperatives in years to come, and delay transfer of recourse management to 
more effective (and competitive) structures. The prospects for changing the “high 
sustainability” of small-scale and subsistence farming is mostly determined by the overall 
development of the economy, and increased non-farm employment and income opportunities. 
However, it is less likely to have significant positive changes in that respect in near future49. 
Simultaneously, this type of farming (especially miniature “domestic” livestock operations) 
will hardly be able to meet new EU quality, veterinary, phito-sanitary, environmental, animal 
welfare etc. standards. On the other hand, for the authorities it will be practically impossible 
(costly or politically undesirable) to enforce the official standards in that huge informal 
sector of the economy. Therefore, massive (semi)subsistence farming with primitive 
technology, food safety and animal welfare standards will continue to exist in years to come. 
The CAP will also promote modernization of farms through expanding variety of 
contractual and organizational innovations - specific sort of contracts, new type of producers 
associations, spreading vertically integrated modes etc. Special forms will emerge allowing 
agents to take advantage of the large public programs - specializing in project preparation, 
management, and execution; investing in “relations capital” or “negative” entrepreneurship; 
modes for lobbying and representation; coalitions for complying with formal criteria (e.g. 
minimum farm size of UAA for direct payments, membership requirements for producers’ 
organizations) etc.   
Last but not least important, the CAP implementation will further improve income and 
social position of large business entrepreneurs located mainly in the richest regions of the 
country. However, a great majority of farmers would hardly see immediate changes in their 
social situation. Agrarian and rural development funds will less likely to reach the mass 
farmers, and contribute to diminishing socio-economic divergence between farms and 
regions.  
Our analysis on likely impact of CAP on environmental, social and organizational 
sustainability of farms is supported by the leading Bulgarian experts as well.  
                                                 
49 Overall unemployed rate is above 12% reaching in rural areas to 14.6% (National Statistical 
Institute). Real figures for unemployment are probably higher. 
Table 10:    Experts assessment of likely short-term impact of CAP implementation on environmental, social and organizational  
                                                                                   sustainability of Bulgarian farms (percent) 
 
Unregistered farms Agro-firms Cooperatives 
Relatively small Relatively big Relatively small Relatively big Relatively small Relatively big 
 
Impact of CAP on: 
Crop Live-
stock 
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock
Mix Crop Live-
stock 
Mix 
Environment                   
Positive 43 43 43 57 57 43 43 43 29 71 86 71 57 57 43 71 71 71 
Neutral 57 57 57 29 29 43 57 43 57 14 0 14 43 29 43 14 14 14 
Negative 0 0 0 14 14 14 0 14 14 14 14 14 0 14 14 14 14 14 
Animal welfare                   
Positive 0 0 0 29 86 57 0 57 29 14 86 71 14 14 0 14 86 57 
Neutral 100 100 100 71 14 43 100 43 71 86 14 29 86 86 100 86 14 43 
Negative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Farmers social status                   
Positive 0 0 0 100 86 86 57 43 43 86 71 71 29 14 14 71 43 43 
Neutral 86 43 86 0 0 0 14 14 14 14 14 29 43 43 57 29 29 57 
Negative 14 57 14 0 14 14 29 43 43 0 14 0 29 43 29 0 29 0 
Change in organizational 
form 
                  
Positive 14 14 14 43 43 43 14 14 14 29 29 29 0 0 0 29 29 29 
Neutral 57 43 57 57 57 57 57 43 57 71 71 71 71 57 71 71 57 71 
Negative 29 43 29 0 0 0 29 43 29 0 0 0 29 43 29 0 14 0 
Source: personal interview with the leading experts on farm structures 
 Most experts expect that CAP implementation will improve environmental activities of 
relatively bigger firms, and specialized unregistered farms, and the largest part of  the  
cooperatives (there are variation only for smaller mix cooperatives) (Table 10). For the rest 
of the farms experts guess is for a neutral (lack of) short-term impact on eco-performance of 
the farms. As far as impact on animal welfare in different type of farms is concerned, most 
experts imply that it will be positive for “professional” operators (bigger livestock and mix 
farms of all types, and for smaller livestock firms).  The experts forecast are that CAP would 
not bring about a change in the animal situation in small farms during firsts years of 
implementation. 
A predominant part of experts see an improvement of social status of farmers in all 
bigger-size unregistered farms and firms, in large crop cooperatives, and smaller-size firms.  
However, for the vast majority of farms experts do not expect any positive impact of CAP on 
social statues of farmers. What is more, a good part of them estimate a negative immediate 
effect with the introduction of CAP for all small (“unprofessional”) livestock farms and for 
relatively bigger mix firms. 
According to the experts estimates the new market and institutional environment will 
not bring about a progressive change in the existing organizational structure of farming until 
2009. Farms development will be carried out through technological modernization, 
optimization of production structure, and enlargement of farm size, but it would not be 
connected with a significant organizational modernization.  
Despite that the level of sustainability of different type and kind of farms will be 
changing as a result of the CAP implementation. A good portion of experts believe that new 
environment will affect organizational development of the beiger unregistered farms. On the 
other hand, evolution of market and institutional environment will have a negative impact on 
organizational form of all small livestock farms (closure, reorganization, modernizations).  
   
6. Conclusions 
 
The comparative institutional and transaction costs analysis of Bulgarian agriculture 
gives a new insight into the pace and outcome of the institutional modernization and EU 
integration. It helps us better understand much of the “phenomenon” of Bulgarian transition, 
and driving factors, efficiency, and sustainability of the specific governing structures.  
Our study demonstrates that responding to the “specific” market, economic and 
institutional environment, agrarian agents develop a variety of effective modes to govern 
their exchange and activities – formal, informal; market, private, hybrid; simple, interlinked, 
complex; uni-, bi-, multilateral; subsistent, member-oriented, commercial, business etc. 
Moreover, an analysis of the specific governance (coordination, incentive, adaptive, 
transaction costs etc.) features is the key for proper evaluation of “high” efficiency and 
sustainability of typical business, cooperative, small commercial, and subsistence farms. 
Similarly, the actual efficiency of a particular mode for land supply, labor supply, inputs 
supply, financing, insurance supply, and marketing could be only estimated taking into 
account the comparative governance costs and benefits. Furthermore, this new framework let 
us make more realistic prediction about the feasible pace of EU CAP implementation in 
“Bulgarian” conditions, and assess its “specific” (different from other EU countries) impact 
on farms structures and sustainability.  
Our new approach requires giving up traditional “institutional neutral”, “transaction 
costs free”, “normative”, “uni-disciplinary”, “sectoral” etc. models.  It obliges to focus on 
analysis of structure of de-facto (formal and informal) property rights; and spectrum of 
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agrarian transactions, and institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and technological factors of 
transacting costs; and comparative advantages of alternative modes for governing of 
individuals exchange. That new area of research also calls for new kind of “microeconomic” 
data for transaction costs, their critical attributes, and modes of organization.  
The powerful institutional and transaction costs analyses should not be restricted to 
academic studies. It has to be broadly used in designing, management, and assessment of 
various public (EU, Government etc.) policies and modes of intervention in agrarian sector. It 
could also contribute significantly to improvement of the governance of diverse farms, 
cooperatives, and business organizations. Last but not least important, this new concept may 
perfect the comparative studies between EU, candidate and transitional countries, defining 
efficiency of the specific governing structures and explaining the “logic” of their 
development. 
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